There are two general conceptions on the relationship between probability and logic. In the first, these systems are viewed as complementary—having offsetting strengths and weaknesses—and there exists a fusion of the two that creates a reasoning system that improves upon each. In the second, probability is viewed as an instance of logic, given some sufficiently broad formulation of it, and it is this that should inform the development of more general reasoning systems. These two conceptions are in conflict with each (...) other, where the root issue of contention is the proper abstraction of the concept of logical consequence. In this work, we put forth a proposal on this abstraction based on an extension of the subset relation through the use of projections, which in turn, allows for the formalization of valid inferences to more general settings. Our proposal results in a formalism that encompasses probability and classical logic, and importantly, does so with minimal machinery. This formalism makes assertions about the relationship between these two systems that are explicit, and suggests a path forward in the development of alternatives to them. (shrink)