This paper examines the iconic conception of aesthetic education in the work of Friedrich Schiller, with the aim of elucidating Schiller’s unique innovation of this notion in understanding i) the relationship between aesthetic and ethical value and ii) the transformative possibilities within a collective, social dimension of aesthetic experience. The paper provides an overview of the Kantian origins of Schiller’s aesthetic programme (Section 1). It then considers Schiller’s critique of the perceived failings of the Kantian and Enlightenment republican models of (...) ethical value and political emancipation (Section 2) before turning to his positive alternative aesthetic programme (Section 3). The paper concludes (Section 4) with some evaluation and reflection on Schiller’s original contributions. (shrink)

We often talk and behave as if being a man required more than just being male, and being a woman required more than just being female. There are expectations that need to be met if someone wants to fully qualify as a man or a woman in their social environment, expectations regarding their behaviour as well as character. It is, however, not entirely obvious what ‘being a man’ or ‘being a woman’ actually means and in what way and to what (...) extent it defines our identity, making us who we are. Would I be a different person if I were a woman? And what would it take for me to be a woman? Could I conceivably be neither? Or both? If gender were nothing but sex, telling a man to ‘be a man’ would make little sense. We may have different ideas about what it means to be a man or woman and how we need to behave in order to secure or maintain our manhood or womanhood, but we are all likely to have some deeply ingrained understanding of what makes a man a man and a woman a woman that goes beyond mere biology. Does it, however, follow that gender can, if necessary or desired, be completely detached from sex, that I can be a woman despite having all the physical attributes of a male member of my species, or a man despite being biologically female? If so, on what grounds exactly would we decide who is what? (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that the notion of qiyun (spirit consonance) in the context of landscape painting involves a moral dimension. The Confucian doctrine of sincerity involved in bringing the landscapist’s or audience’s mind in accord with the Dao underpins the moral dimension of spiritual communion between artist, object, audience and work. By projecting Kant’s, and Schiller’s somewhat modified Kantian philosophy of aesthetic autonomy and the moral relevance of art into the qiyun-focused context, we shall see that reflection on (...) parallels and differences between the two cultural traditions helps to better understand the moral dimension of qiyun aesthetics. (shrink)

The article, speaking from the double perspective of media history and political aesthetics, discusses the impact of behaviourism and early computer technology on the design of learning environments in the United States after the Second World War. By revisiting B. F. Skinner’s approaches to behavioural techniques and cultural engineering, and by showing how these principles were applied first at US design departments, and later to prison education, it argues that cybernetic and behavioural techniques merged in the common field of design (...) and education. Behavioural design of the 1960s and 1970s furthered the cybernetic dream of total control over the world by addressing the learning environment rather than the individual, and operated within a space of possibility that was governed equally by technology and aesthetics. Behavioural design can therefore be understood as a political technology. (shrink)

Schiller was one of many early post-Kantians who wrestled with Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, a doctrine that continues to puzzle commentators today. Schiller’s own explanation of why we are prone to pursue happiness without restriction is, I argue, subtle and multilayered: it offers us a new genealogy of reflective agency, linking our tendency to egoism to the first emergence of reason within human beings. On the reading I defend, our drive for the absolute does not lead us directly to (...) moral autonomy; rather, it misleads us to seek the absolute in the field of our own impulses and inclinations. However, since this detour is the result of cognitive error, it involves no willful subordination of the moral law to self-love, and so nothing that bears the guilt of evil. (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, philosopher Immanuel Kant explored whether art can be learned, as well as the nature of aesthetic ideas that underpin the creative process of making art. Much the same way, teachers and professors still question whether artistic talent and creativity can be learned and how to foster students’ creativity in schools and universities. For example, some professors believe that students come into their classroom either possessing creativity or not possessing creativity,1 which resonates with (...) the misconception that creativity is not related to intelligence and that intelligence is fixed and static as opposed to fluid.2 Students, too, sometimes reject the notion that they.. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo principal de este artículo es mostrar las importantes consecuencias antropológicas que tiene el análisis kantiano de lo sublime. A partir de la idea de lo sublime de Kant, primero, se desprende una alta estimación de la humanidad y, segundo, se deduce un concepto de ser humano como finitud infinita. Dado que lo sublime es además respeto por la naturaleza, también se infiere una concepción de la naturaleza opuesta a la que representa la modernidad científica, una naturaleza humanizada (...) digna de admiración y respeto.: The main goal of this paper is to show the important anthropological consequences of the Kantian analysis of the sublime. From Kant’s idea of the sublime, first, a high estimation of humanity is inferred and, second, a concept of human being as infinite finitude is deduced. Since the sublime is also respect for nature, it also infers a conception of nature opposite to that represented by scientific modernity, a humanized nature worthy of admiration and respect. (shrink)

Is there tension in a view of the conditions of being in a proper position to make aesthetic evaluations that is committed to aesthetic autonomy and norms of exposure? I define ‘aesthetic autonomy’ in terms of the Kantian idea that in order to make a proper aesthetic evaluation, one must rely on oneself rather than on any outside source. I define ‘norms of exposure’ in terms of the Humean idea that practice and aesthetic education are conditions of proper aesthetic evaluation. (...) Prima facie, these two commitments point toward competing accounts of whether exposure is a condition of being in a position to make proper aesthetic evaluations. However, I argue that a closer look at the Kantian position reveals that aesthetic exposure is a condition of being able to make aesthetic evaluations in an autonomous way in the Kantian framework. (shrink)

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant has been important in education theory, especially in the historical context of the Enlightenment and its legacies on contemporary understandings of global education. Particular reference is given to Kant’s writing on Enlightenment thinking and especially to his 1803 Über Pädagogik/Lectures on pedagogy whose groundwork tends to be thought from an empirical anthropology. This paper aims to question education, though from the perspective of a Kantian understanding of aesthetic experience, a perspective developed initially from my reading (...) of Denis J. Schmidt’s Lyrical and Ethical Subjects. In the Critique of Judgement, Kant develops an ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ that offers transcendental grounds for the possibility of aesthetic experience. In doing so, he discusses, somewhat briefly, training in the fine arts and even more briefly offers, somewhat indirectly, a far-reaching transcendental ground for pedagogy. It is these two brief accounts that form the substance of this paper, requiring a somewhat extended introduction to Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement in order to develop its analysis. From this analysis, two key questions arise: if fine art cannot be learned, and if imitation would ultimately aim at producing an objectively determinable rule—via a determinable concept—for the production of art works, how does one proceed with education in the fine arts? And, secondly, as a corollary, if genius is reserved for precisely what cannot be learned but yet can be conceived and communicated, what possible purpose is served by aesthetic ideas with respect to cognition itself? (shrink)

La base conceptual de lo que sería más tarde desarrollado por las vanguardias artísticas fue colonizada por alemanes de pensamiento romántico e idealista, cuya dimensión utópica puede ser fácilmente reconocida en el «antiguo programa del idealismo alemán» (1796), un texto que consagró un pensamiento idealista, que clamó por una nueva racionalidad o una mitología de la razón de Hegel, la intuición intelectual de Schelling y la Humanidad de Schiller. Aunque este proyecto de emancipación desarrollado más tarde por la vanguardia ha (...) perdido su credibilidad para nosotros, todavía tenemos que investigar en qué medida el arte de hoy puede mantener una función social. Este artículo señala algunos conceptos idealistas a la luz de una filosofía del arte, y fue creado siguiendo las líneas esbozadas en la Crítica del juicio de Kant, que han contribuido a la historia de la «avanzada» del arte. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Our discussion addresses Benjamin’s antifascist education through the lens of aesthetic education and Herbert Marcuse’s aesthetic theory. While this theme is not explicitly discussed in Lewis’ book, we argue that it is essential for understanding the full political and educational potential of what he calls “the art of straying in the city”. Such straying is aesthetic in a twofold way: it allows for the city to be experienced as a massive work of art, and at the same time it (...) makes the one who strays an artist who creates herself as a work of art. This unique relation to the urban world is an antifascist and anticapitalist educational experience, as it becomes a politically creative catalyst for imagining another way of relating to self, others, and environment – a relation liberated from the imperatives of utility and profit. (shrink)