Verificou-se que, embora haja uma série de publicações contextualizando o pensamento de Rousseau no debate contemporâneo sobre a filosofia ambiental, a participação de seu pensamento é ainda diminuta. Relacionaram-se então alguns conceitos fundamentais da ecologia radical contemporânea com a filosofia rousseauniana. Constatou-se que ambos procedem a uma crítica radical do antropocentrismo, propondo, como alternativa, um ecocentrismo. Concentrou-se no conceito de “valor intrínseco” da natureza e suas implicações éticas no relacionamento entre homem e ambiente. No caso de Rousseau essa relação se (...) desenvolve por meio de uma profunda análise das paixões amor-de-si e amor-próprio. Constatou-se que tanto a ecologia radical como Rousseau não acreditam na possibilidade de uma volta ao estado de natureza, porém é possível recuperar a experiência feliz da ligação com a totalidade da vida, que esse estado proporcionava aos homens. A recuperação somente pode ocorrer em outro registro, em meio à civilização e à tecnologia. Mostrou-se a importância da estratégia rousseauniana nessa questão ao propor a expansão do amor-próprio até uma dimensão de totalidade, recuperando dessa forma a possibilidade de uma vida feliz e significativa. Entretanto, tanto Rousseau como os partidários da ecologia radical consideram as dificuldades em se realizar tanto a experiência da totalidade como da vida ética na relação entre homem e natureza, dada as condições da contemporaneidade. (shrink)

Environmental ethics is generally searching for the intrinsic value in natural beings. However, there are very few holistic models trying to reflect the various dimensions of the experience-to-be a natural being. We are searching for that intrinsic value, in order to determine which species are holders of rights. In this article, I suggest a set of moral and rational principles to be used for identifying the intrinsic value of a given species and for comparing it to that of other species.

The spectacle of the relentless use and abuse of animals in various human enterprises led some human beings to formulate animal welfare policies and to offer philosophical arguments on the basis of which the humane treatment of animals could be defended rationally. According to the animal welfare concept, animals should be provided some comfort and freedom of movement in the period prior to the moment when they are killed. This concept emphasizes the physiological, psychological, and natural aspects of animal life (...) with the focus on freedom. Ironically, however it is not concerned with the rights of animals; nor is it interested in their remaining alive. So, animals are least benefitted by such provisions, which is the major concern for those who defend animal rights. It seems dubious to demand comfort for a being in life, but not security for its actual life, since rights and freedom are essential for the maintenance of a normal life. This paper aims to critically analyze the animal welfare system, which prioritizes only freedom; to demonstrate how animal welfare is incomplete without animal rights and how they are closely related to each other; and to bridge the gap between animal welfare and animal rights. The underlying principle of animal welfare concept is restricted by its anthropocentric framework with the result that the ethical element is missing. Mere ‘freedom’ is not sufficient for constituting an ideal animal welfare domain. In order to achieve real animal well-being, it is necessary to consider both the rights as well as the welfare of animals. (shrink)

The creation of transgenic animals by means of modern techniques of genetic manipulation is evaluated in the light of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value. The zoocentric interpretation, emphasizing the suffering of individual, sentient animals, is described as an extension of the anthropocentric interpretation. In a biocentric or ecocentric approach the concept of intrinsic value first of all denotes independence of humans and a non-instrumental relation to animals. In the zoocentric approach of Bernard Rollin, genetic engineering is seen (...) as a morally neutral tool, as long as the animal does not suffer as a result of it. Robert Colwell who defends an ecocentric ethic, makes a sharp distinction between wild animals and domesticated animals. Genetic manipulation of wild species is a serious moral issue, in contrast to genetic manipulation of domesticated species which is no problem at all for Colwell. Both authors do not take the species-specific nature (or telos) of domesticated animals seriously. When domestication is seen as a process between the two poles of the wild animal and the human construct (which can be patented), the technique of genetic manipulation can only be seen as a further encroachment upon the intrinsic value of animals. At the level of molecular biology, the concept of an animal's telos loses its meaning. (shrink)