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  1. Markets in votes: Alienability, strict secrecy, and political clientelism.Nicolás Maloberti - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (2):193-215.
    Standard rationales for the illegality of markets in votes are based on concerns over the undue influence of wealth and the erosion of civic responsibility that would result from the commodification of votes. I present an alternative rationale based on how the mere alienability of votes alters the strategic setting faced by political actors. The inalienability of votes ensure the strict secrecy of voting, that is, the inability of voters to communicate credibly to others the content of their votes. In (...)
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  • Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth.Alfred Archer, Bart Engelen & Viktor Ivanković - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (1):39-54.
    What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets. One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, Taylor :313–328, (...)
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  • Markets in Votes, Voter Liberty, and the Burden of Justification.James Stacey Taylor - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:325-340.
    Christopher Freiman, Jason Brennan, and Peter M. Jaworski have recently defended markets in votes. While their views differ in several respects they all believe that the primary justificatory burden lies not with those who defend markets in votes but with those who oppose them. Yet while the burden of proof should typically rest with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods this does not hold for the debate over markets in votes. Votes are crucially different from other goods (...)
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  • Two (Weak) Cheers for Markets in Votes.James Stacey Taylor - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):223-239.
    This paper offers the first moral defense of markets in votes in a democratic electoral system based on majority rule where there are no moral restrictions on how votes can be cast. In Part 1 I outline the type of vote buying that I defend in this paper, and defend my methodological assumption. In Part 2 I criticize Freiman’s arguments for legalizing vote buying. In Part 3 I outline and reply to some responses that could be made to my criticisms (...)
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