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  1. Akrasia, reasons, and causes.Alfred R. Mele - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (3):345-368.
    The occurrence or apparent occurrence of incontinent actions challenges several influential views in ethics and the philosophy of mind, e.g., Hare's prescriptivism and the Socratic idea that we always act in the light of the imagined greatest good. It also raises, as I shall explain, an interesting and instructive problem for proponents of causal theories of action. But whereas Socrates and Hare attempt to avoid the difficulties with which akrasia confronts them by denying - wrongly, I shall argue - that (...)
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  • Intentions, all-out evaluations and weakness of the will.Edmund Henden - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):53-74.
    The problem of weakness of the will is often thought to arise because of an assumption that freely, deliberately and intentionally doing something must correspond to the agent's positive evaluation of doing that thing. In contemporary philosophy, a very common response to the problem of weakness has been to adopt the view that free, deliberate action does not need to correspond to any positive evaluation at all. Much of the support for this view has come from the difficulties the denial (...)
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  • Akrasia, instincts and revealed preferences.Alvaro Sandroni - 2011 - Synthese 181 (S1):1 - 17.
    The standard economic theory of choice is extended to accommodate a particular form of akratic choice. The empirical content of the new theory is fully characterized. A characterization of revealed akratic choice, in terms of observable choice only, is also provided. These results are consistent with the viewpoint that akrasia is a concept that can be empirically substantiated.
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