In a well-known passage of Plato's Protagoras the sophist of that name is made to suggest that what makes a society or community of human beings possible is their possession of δίκη and αίδώϧ, which are given to them by Zeus. But though all men have these qualities, they are not ‘natural’ in the way that ugliness or beauty of face is natural. They are acquired; and Protagoras gives a detailed description of how they are inculcated, first by parents, then (...) by schoolmasters, and then by laws. The view that these qualities are peculiar to men was, of course, not a new one. Already in the Works and Days Hesiod writes,And again the age of lawlessness and violence is described as. (shrink)

Although there is a long tradition, going back at least to the tenth century, that would see Aristophanes' Birds as somehow related to the exile in Lacedaemon of Alcibiades, and to the fortification of the Attic township of Decelea by his Spartan hosts , current scholarship surrounding Birds is firmly in the hands of those who are antipathetic to seeing the creation of Cloudcuckooland in terms of a political allegory. ‘The majority of scholars today…flatly reject a political reading’; Birds has (...) ‘no strong and obvious connection with a topical question of public interest’; ‘attempts to find in Birds any extensive allegorical comment…are unconvincing’. Not only is it widely believed that ‘Birds… is strangely free of political concerns’. but also that ‘the theme of the Birds is absurdity itself…it is about meaninglessness’ . This is a tradition that descends from A. W. von Schlegel, for whom Birds was ‘merely a “Lustspiel”, full of imagination and the marvellous, with amusing touches at everything, but with no particular object’. This approach was reinforced by the fact that by the second half of the nineteenth century, the allegorists had apparently spun out of control. By 1879, there were no fewer than 79 accounts of the Tendenz of the Birds —some political, some ‘escapist fantasy’–on offer. The most influential allegorical interpretation of Birds was J. W. Suvern's study of 1826, but which is now generally dismissed, and only mentioned to be held up as a warning to those who might be tempted to take the allegorical route. This paper takes a different point of departure, namely Pierre Brumoy's Le thétre des grecs , an allegorical treatment that is full of good sense, and which was too hastily dismissed by Suvern, and ignored by others. (shrink)

This paper examines G. W. F. Hegel’s interpretation of Plato from his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, situating his interpretation historically and noting features that resonate with contemporary Plato scholarship. Hegel forms his interpretation prior to stylometric studies of the dialogues, and distinguishes his Plato from Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher’s views. Hegel responds to important interpretive concerns: 1) the relationship between Socratic and Platonic thought, 2) the dialogue form, 3) Platonic Anonymity and 4) Platonic myth. (...) His treatment of these issues is illustrative with respect to understanding Hegelian philosophy and the history of Plato interpretation. (shrink)

Plato targets the encomiastic genre in three separate dialogues: theLysis, theMenexenusand theSymposium. Many studies have been devoted to Plato's handling of the funeral oration in theMenexenus. Plato's critique of the encomium in theLysisandSymposium, however, has not been accorded the same kind of treatment. Yet both of these dialogues go beyond theMenexenusin exploring the opposition between encomiastic and philosophic discourse. In theLysis, I will argue, Plato sets up encomiastic rhetoric as a foil for Socrates' dialectical method; philosophic discourse is both defined (...) and legitimated by way of its opposition to eulogy. In theSymposium, Plato offers a much more complex critique. First, he illustrates and comments on the vices that inhere in the encomiastic genre. Second, he juxtaposes Socrates' ironic ‘praises’ of his interlocutors with traditional encomiastic discourse, thus inviting the reader to explore the relation between Socratic irony and the rhetoric of eulogy (and censure). And, third, theSymposiumexhibits two untraditional ‘encomia’ – Socrates' eulogy for Eros and Alcibiades' for Socrates – that illustrate and interrogate the false ontology underlying the rhetoric of praise. (shrink)

The interrogation of Meletus in the Apology at 24c4–28al is not infrequently seen as a typical case of all that is intellectually and artistically dissatisfying in Plato's practice of the genre of philosophical dialogue: not only are we presented with a philosopher who makes some claim to being committed to setting a particularly stringent standard for honesty in argumentation making sophistical arguments, but we are presented also with a cardboard interlocutor who is forced by the hand of Plato to acquiesce (...) to those arguments in a fashion that is completely dissatisfying to the reader. The best anyone seems to do to save Plato from these charges of artistic incompetence and intellectual dishonesty is to appeal to such a level of historical accuracy for the text that the stupidity of Meletus' responses can be attributed to the stupidity of Meletus himself, or to point out features of the political and legal situation that might prevent Meletus from answering the questions by drawing on his true motivation—which is presumably more coherent. Taylor says of this passage: The humour of the situation is that the prosecutor cannot venture to say what he means by either of his charges without betraying the fact that, owing to the ‘amnesty’, the matters complained of are outside of the competency of the court… Hence, when Meletus is pressed to explain what he means, he has to take refuge in puerile nonsense. (shrink)

Although there is a long tradition, going back at least to the tenth century, that would see Aristophanes'Birds(performed in the spring of 414 B.C.) as somehow related to the exile in Lacedaemon of Alcibiades, and to the fortification of the Attic township of Decelea by his Spartan hosts (Arg. Av. 1 Coulon), current scholarship surroundingBirdsis firmly in the hands of those who are antipathetic to seeing the creation of Cloudcuckooland in terms of a political allegory. ‘The majority of scholars today…flatly (...) reject a political reading’;Birdshas ‘no strong and obvious connection with a topical question of public interest’; ‘attempts to find inBirdsany extensive allegorical comment…are unconvincing’. Not only is it widely believed that ‘Birds… is strangely free of political concerns’. but also that ‘the theme of theBirdsis absurdity itself…it is about meaninglessness’ (ibid. 179). This is a tradition that descends from A. W. von Schlegel, for whomBirdswas ‘merely a “Lustspiel”, full of imagination and the marvellous, with amusing touches at everything, but with no particular object’. This approach was reinforced by the fact that by the second half of the nineteenth century, the allegorists had apparently spun out of control. By 1879, there were no fewer than 79 accounts of theTendenzof theBirds—some political, some ‘escapist fantasy’–on offer. The most influential allegorical interpretation ofBirdswas J. W. Suvern's study of 1826, but which is now generally dismissed, and only mentioned to be held up as a warning to those who might be tempted to take the allegorical route. This paper takes a different point of departure, namely Pierre Brumoy'sLe thétre des grecs(Paris, 1730), an allegorical treatment that is full of good sense, and which was too hastily dismissed by Suvern, and ignored by others. (shrink)

In a well-known passage of Plato's Protagoras the sophist of that name is made to suggest that what makes a society or community of human beings possible is their possession of δίκη and αίδώϧ, which are given to them by Zeus. But though all men have these qualities, they are not ‘natural’ in the way that ugliness or beauty of face is natural. They are acquired; and Protagoras gives a detailed description of how they are inculcated, first by parents, then (...) by schoolmasters, and then by laws. The view that these qualities are peculiar to men was, of course, not a new one. Already in the Works and Days Hesiod writes,And again the age of lawlessness and violence is described as. (shrink)

Such is John Stuart Mill's succinct exposition of the core of utilitarian theory. A contemporary philosopher has aptly described utilitarianism as ‘the combination of two principles: the consequentialist principle that the rightness, or wrongness, of an action is determined by the goodness, or badness, of the results that flow from it and the hedonist principle that the only thing that is good in itself is pleasure and the only thing bad in itself is pain. Although the consequentialistprinciple has attracted the (...) most attention in modern discussions of utilitarianism, it is the second principle which invites immediate comparison with the views of Plato. I propose therefore to start by comparing the Platonic and the utilitarian conceptions of the good in the hope that this will enable us to see too in what sense Plato's position is consequentialist, and whether his ethical and political theories in general can properly be described as utilitarian. (shrink)

Such is John Stuart Mill's succinct exposition of the core of utilitarian theory. A contemporary philosopher has aptly described utilitarianism as ‘the combination of two principles: (1)the consequentialist principlethat the rightness, or wrongness, of an action is determined by the goodness, or badness, of the results that flow from it and (2)the hedonist principlethat the only thing that is good in itself is pleasure and the only thing bad in itself is pain. Although the consequentialistprinciple has attracted the most attention (...) in modern discussions of utilitarianism, it is the second principle which invites immediate comparison with the views of Plato. I propose therefore to start by comparing the Platonic and the utilitarian conceptions of the good in the hope that this will enable us to see too in what sense Plato's position is consequentialist, and whether his ethical and political theories in general can properly be described as utilitarian. (shrink)

Argues that the path to the good life does not consist in working toward some abstract concept of the good, but rather by ameliorating the problems of the practices and institutions that make up our practical life.

Faced with a choice between escaping without consequences and submitting to a democratic decision, Socrates chooses the latter. So immense is Socrates’ duty to obey law, we are led to believe, that even the threat of death is insufficient to abrogate it. Crito proposes several arguments purporting to ground Socrates’ strong duty to obey, with the appeal to the Athenian system’s democratic credentials carrying most of the normative weight. A careful reading of the dialogue, in conjunction with the ‘Apology’, reveals, (...) however, a more complex picture. If Crito sets the conditions that render a regime legitimate, and therefore warranting of obedience, the Apology reveals a legal system’s shortcomings that justify disobedience. This article substantiates this position by delineating circumstances that can justify resistance. Contemporary forms of political resistance can also rely on similar conditions. Plato’s texts anticipate the current democratic turn of civil disobedience. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do diálogo Menêxeno de Platão, com notas culturais, históricas e algumas de elucidação sobre as escolhas tradutórias. Acrescenta-se uma breve introdução ao texto.

This paper investigates the degree to which information theory, and the derived uses that make it work as a metaphor of our age, can be helpful in thinking about God’s immanence and transcendance. We ask when it is possible to say that a consciousness has to be behind the information we encounter. If God is to be thought about as a communicator of information, we need to ask whether a communication system has to pre-exist to the divine and impose itself (...) to God. If we want God to be Creator, and not someone who would work like a human being, ‘creating’ will mean sustaining in being as much the channel, the material system, as the message. Is information control? It seems that God’s actions are not going to be informational control of everything. To clarify the issue, we attempt to distinguish two kinds of ‘genialities’ in nature, as a way to evaluate the likelihood of God from nature. We investigate concepts and images of God, in terms of the history of ideas but also in terms of philosophical theology, metaphysics, and religious ontology. (shrink)

Several contemporary virtue scholars trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications showing that Plato had already conceived of and had begun developing the concept of intellectual virtues in his discussion of the ideal city-state in the Republic. I argue that the Platonic conception of rational desires satisfies the motivational component of intellectual virtues while his dialectical method satisfies the success component. In addition, (...) I show that Plato considers episteme as the primary intellectual virtue. Episteme, which is quite similar to Pritchard’s The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) conception of understanding, is a cognitive achievement that cannot be attained by luck or testimony. The realization that Plato was the first to conceive of and develop the concept of intellectual excellences is not merely of historic significance. I illustrate, through the example of Zagzebski’s virtue theory, how the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues could prove promising in contemporary debates on virtue epistemology theories. (shrink)

This is a study of the correspondence between Forms and particulars in Plato. The aim is to determine whether they exhibit an ontological symmetry, in other words, whether there is always one where there is the other. This points to two questions, one on the existence of things that do not have corresponding Forms, the other on the existence of Forms that do not have corresponding things. Both questions have come up before. But the answers have not been sufficiently sensitive (...) to the intricacies of the questions. Nor have they been adequately resourceful with what little evidence there is in the original sources. The intention here is to make up for that deficiency, not just with better answers but also with better insight into the questions. (shrink)

We examine the discussion about the definition of knowledge as true judgment accompanied by logos in Theaetetus 201c-210c, in order to ascertain which of the recent alternative interpretations is more consistent with the text. To accomplish this, we intend to analyze the text and explore in detail the secondary literature about it.

This book is a quest for the real Plato, forever hiding behind the veil of drama. The quest, as the subtitle indicates, is Cartesian in that it looks for Plato independently of the prevailing paradigms on where we are supposed to find him. The result of the quest is a complete pedagogical platform on Plato. This does not mean that the book leaves nothing out, covering all the dialogues and all the themes, but that it provides the full intellectual apparatus (...) for doing just that. It consists of two parts. The first is a general orientation in three chapters, one each pertaining to the life, thought, and works of Plato. The second is a dialogic companion covering the four dialogues built around the last days of Socrates, with a separate chapter devoted to each: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. (shrink)

Two readings of the much-discussed περιτροπή argument of "Theaetetus" 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at (...) the same time he is forced by that very claim to admit that no one does" (Burnyeat 1976b: 48). I discuss and criticise both readings, and present a third, according to which the point of the argument is, very roughly, that Protagoras is committed to equating truth and truth-for, and so, further, to their intersubstitutability. This further commitment proves fatal to his argument. (shrink)

Resumen Platón proyecta en la República un programa cultural que supone la redefinición del papel de la poesía tradicional en razón de su asociación con los regímenes democrático y tiránico. Esto, según pretendo mostrar, puede vincularse de manera legítima con la polémica anticirenaica de Platón contra Aristipo. Para ello, por un lado, exploraré los rasgos del biotipo tiránico y su régimen concomitante en la República VIII-IX y, por otro, analizaré sus vínculos con los planteamientos anticirenaicos en el Gorgias. Este examen (...) permitirá ofrecer claves de análisis para dos pasajes muy discutidos de la República IX: el símil del ascensor y el número del tirano, que cobran una nueva luz a partir de la consideración de esta polémica intrasocrática.Plato put forward in Republic a cultural program which implies the redefinition of the role of traditional poetry due to its association with the democratic and tyrannical regimes. I intend to show that this point is connected with the anti-cyrenaic arguments that Plato raises against Aristippus. On the one hand, I will study the features of the tyrannical biotype and its correspondent regime in Republic VIII-IX, and, on the other, I will analyze its links with the anti-cyrenaic arguments in Gorgias. This exam will allow us to offer some clues to better understand two widely debated passages in Republic IX: the analogy of the lift and the tyrant’s number. Both acquire a new perspective when this intra-socratic polemic is taken into account. (shrink)

The question contrasts two ways of expressing the role of the sense organ in perception. In one the expression referring to the sense organ is put into the dative case ; the other is a construction with the preposition δiá governing the genitive case of the word for the sense organ.

Plato’s discourse on beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is distinctly apophatic in nature. Plato describes beauty in terms of what it is not (an approach sometimes referred to apophasis, or the via negativa). In this paper, I argue that Platonic apophatic practise in the Hippias Major and the Symposium depicts beauty as an ally to certain aspirations of philosophical discourse. In the first section, I offer some brief prefatory remarks on the nature of apophasis and its presence (...) in Plato’s thinking. In the second section, I provide some background to the dialogue of the Hippias Major and highlight the apophatic nature of the descriptions of beauty offered therein. In the third and final section, I discuss the Symposium, a dialogue within which, in addition to representing beauty apophatically, Plato illustrates how we may become able to achieve some positive, or cataphatic, insights into the nature of beauty. I conclude that the purpose of the Platonic apophatic portrayal of beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is to show that, while beauty cannot be reduced to a series of assertive truth statements, it can nevertheless function as an accessory to other dimensions of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

This new interpretation of Plato's Parmenides emphasizes its treatment of time and language—insights especially relevant for those working in the Continental tradition.

Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive architecture for (...) a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling 1st-person experience that convinces us that subjective awareness is the mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for building a scientific account is to be consistent with the biophysical causal dependency of prior neural processes. From a 3rd person perspective,, we propose that subjective awareness lacking causal influence, is than our experience of being aware, our awareness of our psychological content, knowing that we are aware, and the belief that that such experiences are evidence of an agentive capacity shared by others. While the human mind can be described as comprising both conscious and nonconscious aspects, both ultimately depend on neural process in the brain. In arguing for the counter-intuitive epiphenomenal perspective, we suggest that a scientific approach considers all mental aspects of mind including consciousness in terms of their underlying, preceding biological changes, in the realization that most brain processes are not accompanied by any discernible change in subjective awareness. (shrink)

En este artículo, intentamos demostrar en qué medida la teoria platónica de lo escrito –cuyas reglas se encuentran, principalmente, en la parte conclusiva del Fedro y en el excursus filosófico de la Carta VII– sea instrumento fundamental para la comprensión de la estructura compositiva del Teeteto. Siendo esto así, reconstruimos, en perspectiva prosopográfica y en armonía con aquellas reglas –según las cuales el mensaje filosófico debe adecuarse a la capacidad de aprehensión del deuteragonista– los perfiles de los personajes centrales del (...) Teeteto, determinando sus funciones teatrograficas en el interior del diálogo. Palabras clave: República; Teeteto; Prosografía; Drama; InterpretaciónIn this paper we attempt to show to what extent the Platonic theory of the written –which rules are, mainly, in the conclusive part of Phaedrus and the philosophical excursus of Letter VII– is a fundamental tool to understand Theaetetus’s structure. This being so, we reconstruct, in a prosopographic perspective, and in harmony with those rules –according to which the philosophical message must fit the deuteragonist’s apprehension ability– the profiles of Theaetetus’s central characters, determining their theatreographic functions in the dialogue. Keywords: Republic; Theaetetus; Prosopography; Drama; Interpretation. (shrink)

There are two basic ways in which the phenomenon of learning is explicated in the Platonic dialogues: First, by means of an analogy with vision, and second, by arguing that the acquisition of knowledge is really anamnesis. The analogy with vision is the more common of the two and occurs throughout the dialogues. The passage in the Republic comparing the sun and the good is the best known instance of this approach to the clarification of learning. The basic point of (...) this explication is that the mind, like the eye, in order to discover truth must be turned in the right direction and be trained to apprehend and distinguish the characters of the objects it beholds. In this context, the acquisition of knowledge is clearly a discovery of that which was not previously known, just as the man who escapes from the cave sees what he had not previously seen, and at the end of the ascent of the heavenly ladder one “begins to see” what he has not seen before. (shrink)

Two readings of the much-discussed περιτροπή argument of "Theaetetus" 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at (...) the same time he is forced by that very claim to admit that no one does" (Burnyeat 1976b: 48). I discuss and criticise both readings, and present a third, according to which the point of the argument is, very roughly, that Protagoras is committed to equating truth and truth-for, and so, further, to their intersubstitutability. This further commitment proves fatal to his argument. (shrink)

On Malcolm Schofield’s highly influential reading of the Similarity Regress in Part I of the Parmenides, the problem that the Regress poses is explanatory. Socrates posited the Similarity Form in order to explain why similar things are similar: similar things are similar because they participate in the Form Similarity as copies of the same original. Yet, the Similarity Regress generates an infinite series of Similarity Forms such that explanation is deferred ad infinitum. Schofield provides a philosophical incentive for adopting his (...) reading. He argues that the treatment of similarity in Part II of the dialogue yields a complete explanation of similarity. If we adopt this account, we can avoid the Similarity Regress altogether since a Form of Similarity is not needed in order to explain why similar things are similar. Thus, his interpretation has a hugely important philosophical pay-off. However, there is a different way to read the argument. Socrates claims that each Form is only one. Yet, the Similarity Regress is an argument that generates an infinite series of Similarity Forms. This results in a violation of the principle of non-contradiction: there is both only one Similarity Form and infinitely many Similarity Forms. Yet, anything that is incompatible with the principle of non-contradiction is surely absurd. Nobody, as far as I am aware, has explored whether this reading also has philosophical pay-off if we look at it together with similarity in Part II. However, should this interpretation pay off, it would be a viable alternative to Schofield’s. In this paper, I explore both views in the context of the treatment of similarity in Part II of the Parmenides. I argue for an account of similarity that differs from Schofield’s. Although my account is not wholly dismissive of Schofield’s, it renders the pay-off of Schofield’s account less appealing than he suggests. Furthermore, I show that the account of similarity in Part II also yields important lessons for the proponent of the alternative reading of the Similarity Regress: similarity as treated in Part II simply leads to further infinite regresses, thereby pushing us to consider rejecting the account of similarity in Part II too and to look for some other account intead. (shrink)

The strange and challenging stretch of dialectic with which Plato’s Sophist begins and ends has confused and frustrated readers for generations, and despite receiving a fair amount of attention, there is no consensus regarding even basic issues concerning this method. Here I offer a new account of bifurcatory division as neither joke nor naïve method, but instead a valuable, propaedeutic method that Plato offers to us readers as a means of embarking upon the kind of mental gymnastics that will stretch (...) us properly in preparation for further, more challenging dialectical work. Considering several interpretive issues, I argue that bifurcatory division is a process of collective inquiry into the common through which an account, both definitional and taxonomical, is discovered. Depending on the level of understanding exhibited by the inquirers, this account may or may not allow for noetic understanding of the object in the deepest sense. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone mostrar que el significado de aisthesis para Protágoras responde al uso y significación de la filosofía jónica, esto es, aún significa indistintamente juicio, sensación, emoción, creencia, en fin, doxa. Esto tiene una consecuencia muy relevante para la comprensión del homo mensura y la tesis que afirma: aisthesis es episteme.

The interrogation of Meletus in the Apology at 24c4–28al is not infrequently seen as a typical case of all that is intellectually and artistically dissatisfying in Plato's practice of the genre of philosophical dialogue: not only are we presented with a philosopher who makes some claim to being committed to setting a particularly stringent standard for honesty in argumentation making sophistical arguments, but we are presented also with a cardboard interlocutor who is forced by the hand of Plato to acquiesce (...) to those arguments in a fashion that is completely dissatisfying to the reader. The best anyone seems to do to save Plato from these charges of artistic incompetence and intellectual dishonesty is to appeal to such a level of historical accuracy for the text that the stupidity of Meletus' responses can be attributed to the stupidity of Meletus himself, or to point out features of the political and legal situation that might prevent Meletus from answering the questions by drawing on his true motivation—which is presumably more coherent. Taylor says of this passage:The humour of the situation is that the prosecutor cannot venture to say what he means by either of his charges without betraying the fact that, owing to the ‘amnesty’, the matters complained of are outside of the competency of the court… Hence, when Meletus is pressed to explain what he means, he has to take refuge in puerile nonsense. (shrink)

Commentators of Plato’s Symposium rarely recognize the importance of traditional Greek conceptions of Eros, paideia and arête in understanding Plato’s critique of the various educational models presented in the dialogue. I will show how Plato contests these models by proposing that education should consist of philosophy. On this interpretation, ancient Greek pedagogy culminates in a philosophical education. For this new form of education, the dialogical model supplants the traditional practices of kléos and poetic mimēsis, inextricably bound to archaia paideia and (...) traditional forms of education. Plato’s Socrates is searching for knowledge and immortality through an application of the philosophical method, one that relies on a conception of Eros and propagation. For Plato’s Socrates, it is through Eros that ancient Greek paideia educates in matters of arête, but eros is not a passion for kléos or for a beautiful young man. Rather, eros is the passion for Beauty itself, a passion that is pursued through philosophical conversation with another, a life of arête. Thus, our investigation serves to define and criticize the various educational models and defend the claim that philosophy is best suited for educating the citizens of Athens. (shrink)

In the Theaetetus Socrates provides an elaboration and discussion of Protagoras’ measure doctrine, grounding it in a “secret doctrine” of flux. This paper argues that the anthropology of the myth in the Protagoras provides an earlier, very different way to explain the measure doctrine, focusing on its application to civic values, such as “just,” “fine,” and “pious.” The paper shows that Protagoras’ explanation of the dual etiology of virtue – that it is acquired both by nature and by nurture – (...) tracks the two meanings of “anthropos” in his formulation of the measure doctrine, as “humankind” and “individual human.” On Protagoras’ account, humankind’s survival can be explained by the fact that humans share shame and justice, which enables them to live together in cities. (shrink)

This article is detective work, not philosophy. J. S. Mill's Autobiography records that at the age of seven he read, in Greek, ‘the first six dialogues of Plato, from the Euthyphron to the Theaetetus inclusive’. Which were the other dialogues? On the arrangement common today, it would be Crito, Apology, Phaedo, Cratylus. On the arrangement common then, Theages and Erastai replace Cratylus, which makes seven dialogues. I show that this must be the answer by the evidence of James Mill's commonplace (...) books and his writings on Plato. These reveal which collected edition of Plato he owned and which he would want to own. Conditions for studying Plato in the original were much harder than we are used to. The inquiry highlights both the ideological purity of the education James Mill designed for his son, and the difficulties he faced in realizing his plan. (shrink)

In the complex teaching paradigm constructed and celebrated in classical Greek philosophy, geometry was the gateway to knowledge. Historically, mathematics provided the generational basis of education in Western civilization. Its impact as a disciplining subject was philosophically served by Plato’s most influential metaphysical involvement with the dialectical interplay of form and content, ideas and images, and the formal, hierarchic divisions of reality. Mathematics became a key--perhaps the key--for the establishment of natural, social and intellectual hierarchies in Plato’s work, and mathematical (...) capacities became synonymous with power--the power of abstraction needed to effect and control change. It was the provenience of the academic demands, levels, and achievements celebrated as culturally Western. From ancient Athens to medieval Europe, it became the principle of interactional/hierarchic selection: Similia similibus cognoscuntur--that is, only those things alike can interact cognitively; this launched the notion that mathematical ability is the best test for objectively determining who does and who does not qualify for a social, political, and intellectual meritocracy. (shrink)

Situated historically at the beginning of the medieval period, Augustine’s thought expresses itself as one of the most influential metaphysical systems of the entire history of philosophy. Such a privileged status has often served to occlude some of the more radical implications of Augustinian thought. Paradoxically, it is precisely this radicality which has led to a resurgence of interest in Augustine, most particularly amongst twentieth century Continental philosophers such as Jacques Derrida. Through a careful analysis of Augustine’s thinking concerning morality, (...) my paper seeks to draw out the metaphysical and epistemological values which lie at the basis of Augustine’s disavowal of the possibility of human virtue. On my interpretation, Augustine is unequivocally arguing against the conception of ‘the freedom of the will’. Moreover, this position is, on my reading, consistently held by Augustine from his earlier to his latest writings. Here, I am arguing against the dominant view that this radical ‘immoralism’ is merely a late development in his thinking. (shrink)