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Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness

Pennsylvania State University Press (2011)

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  1. Self-Respect and Public Reason.Gregory Whitfield - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (6):677-696.
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  • An Interpretation of Rawls’ “Kantian Interpretation.Vadim Chaly - 2015 - Con-Textos Kantianos 1:142-155.
    Calling Kant a liberal philosopher requires important qualifications. Much like his theoretical philosophy, his political transcendentalism was and remains a great enterprise of navigating between the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, of balancing the “empirical” and the “pure” in human society, as well as in human mind. Of all the attempts to enlist Kant among the classics of liberalism, John Rawls’ is the most impressive and thorough. However, it is hardly a success. The reason for this lies in a profound (...)
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  • Reconsidering the Connection Between John Stuart Mill and John Rawls.Alan Reynolds - 2013 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (1).
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  • Democracy Without Autonomy: Moral and Personal Autonomy in Democratic Confucianism.Yvonne Chiu - 2017 - Philosophy East and West 67 (1):47-60.
    The presence and absence of autonomy in Joseph Chan’s democratic Confucianism loom large, but not always in the ways that he maintains. Although Chan claims that his reconstruction of Confucianism for modern democracy can accept some forms of moral autonomy, what he presents does not constitute genuine moral autonomy, and the absence of that autonomy sits in tension with some other aspects of his model. When it comes to personal autonomy, it is the opposite: Chan says that the exercise of (...)
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  • Pluralist Partially Comprehensive Doctrines, Moral Motivation, and the Problem of Stability.Ross Mittiga - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):409-429.
    Recent scholarship has drawn attention to John Rawls’s concern with stability—a concern that, as Rawls himself notes, motivated Part III of A Theory of Justice and some of the more important changes of his political turn. For Rawls, the possibility of achieving ‘stability for the right reasons’ depends on citizens possessing sufficient moral motivation. I argue, however, that the moral psychology Rawls develops to show how such motivation would be cultivated and sustained does not cohere with his specific descriptions of (...)
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  • Rawls, Self-Respect, and Assurance: How Past Injustice Changes What Publicly Counts as Justice.Timothy Waligore - 2016 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (1):42-66.
    This article adapts John Rawls’s writings, arguing that past injustice can change what we ought to publicly affirm as the standard of justice today. My approach differs from forward-looking approaches based on alleviating prospective disadvantage and backward-looking historical entitlement approaches. In different contexts, Rawls’s own concern for the ‘social bases of self-respect’ and equal citizenship may require public endorsement of different principles or specifications of the standard of justice. Rawls’s difference principle focuses on the least advantaged socioeconomic group. I argue (...)
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  • The Priority of Liberty.Robert S. Taylor - 2013 - In David Reidy & Jonathan Mandle (eds.), Companion to Rawls. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 147-163.
    Rawls offers three arguments for the priority of liberty in Theory, two of which share a common error: the belief that once we have shown the instrumental value of the basic liberties for some essential purpose (e.g., securing self-respect), we have automatically shown the reason for their lexical priority. The third argument, however, does not share this error and can be reconstructed along Kantian lines: beginning with the Kantian conception of autonomy endorsed by Rawls in section 40 of Theory, we (...)
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  • Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason.Chad Van Schoelandt - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.
    Public reason accounts commonly claim that exercises of coercive political power must be justified by appeal to reasons accessible to all citizens. Such accounts are vulnerable to the objection that they cannot legitimate coercion to protect basic liberal rights against infringement by deeply illiberal people. This paper first elaborates the distinctive interpersonal conception of justification in public reason accounts in contrast to impersonal forms of justification. I then detail a core dissenter-based objection to public reason based on a worrisome example (...)
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