Plato is commonly considered a metaphysical dualist conceiving of a world of Forms separate from the world of particulars in which we live. This paper explores the motivation for postulating that second world as opposed to making do with the one we have. The main objective is to demonstrate that and how everything, Forms and all, can instead fit into the same world. The approach is exploratory, as there can be no proof in the standard sense. The debate between explaining (...) Plato’s ontology with a single world and requiring a two-world model to make sense of the same thing is typically about scouring the Platonic corpus for evidence and turning to Aristotle for help where we need it. The aim here is to dig deeper than what either of them, or anyone else, has said or implied about the number or worlds, searching instead for any insight that might be gained from the way Forms are supposed to exist versus what we ourselves might understand by existence. Although the paper is, at its most basic level, about the existence of the Forms, the intention is not to prove that they exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections already on record, but to consider how they might exist and what follows if they do. Dialogue toward consensus on why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, could perhaps provide a smoother “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do and where they would if they did. (shrink)

A commentary on the Symposium as a challenge and a gift to Athens. I begin with a reflection on three dates: 416 bce, the date of Agathon’s victory party, c. 400, the approximate date of Apollodorus’ retelling of the party, and c. 375, the approximate date of the ‘publication’ of the dialogue, and I argue that Plato reminds his contemporary Athens both of its great poetic and legal and scientific traditions and of the historical fact that the way late fourth (...) century Athens appropriated them in some way led to the city’s demise at the turn of the century; thus the dialogue is Plato’s challenge to his contemporary Athens to recognize and overcome its flawed relation to its cultural resources. Heard in this way, the key moments are Aristophanes’ implied critique of Pausanias and Eryximachus and Socrates’ implied critique of Aristophanes and Agathon. Proceeding by a close reading, I argue that Plato exposes, for those moved to rise to his challenge, the failure of his great predecessors to conceive the divine in a way that, worthy of the height and otherness divinity requires, can provide substantive orientation for the burgeoning new reason that animates the city’s culture. (shrink)

Despite Diotima’s irresistible virtues and attractiveness across the millennia, she spells trouble for philosophy. It is not her fault that she has been misunderstood, nor is it Plato’s. Rather, I suspect, each era has made of Diotima what it desired her to be. Her malleability is related to the assumption that Plato invented her, that she is a mere literary fiction, licensing the imagination to do what it will. In the first part of my paper, I argue against three contemporary (...) ‘majority views’ about Diotima that I regard as false. The first is that we can be certain she is fictional;1 a second is that Diotima is our best evidence for Plato’s feminism; the third, that she is Plato’s mouthpiece for the higher mysteries in the Symposium. After I have set aside what I regard as false, I proceed in the second half of my paper to develop Diotima’s positive contribution to philosophical psychology, her naturalistic account of the psyche as mortal, unified, and developmental. Whether the view Plato assigns to her is one that he held I do not pretend to know; but it is a powerful, defensible, and coherent view that inspired positive aspects of Freudian psychology in the twentieth century. Freud’s insight, in fact, makes clear how erōs can be developed in relation to the bad as well as the good. (shrink)

By his numerous studies of Xenophon’s Socratic writings (Memorabilia, Symposium, Apology and Oeconomicus), Leo Strauss has greatly contri­buted to their rehabilitation. But, because it gives more importance to what a text delibera­tely passes over than to what it plainly tells, Straussian hermeneutics does not obtain an universal consensus. After dealing with the main grounds for Strauss’s unfailing interest in Xenophon, this study looks into the particular case of the numerous explications Strauss gives of Mem. IV 4, where Socrates defines justice (...) as obedience to the law. A close analysis of these explications shows the risks and puzzles of Straussian hermeneutics. (shrink)

The paper argues that Plato’s dialogue form creates a Quinean “opaque context” that segregates the assertions by Plato’s characters in the dialogues from both Plato and the real world with the result that the dialogues require a hermeneutical interpretation. Sec. I argues that since the assertions in the dialogues are located inside an opaque context, the forms of life of the characters in the dialogues acquires primary philosophical importance for Plato. The second section argues that the thesis of Sec. I (...) coheres with the claim in Plato’s Seventh Letter that since philosophical truth is incommunicable by means of language it is of primary importance for philosophers to develop proper “schemes of living”. Sec. III argues since the forms of life of the characters portrayed in the dialogues is of primary philosophical importance for Plato, and since hermeneutical methods are required to interpret emerging forms of life, Plato’s dialogues are positively crafted to be read hermeneutically. Sec IV argues that Heidegger, who is famous for seeing Plato’s views as antithetical to his own hermeneutical approach, is mistaken, and that Plato’s real views are, in principle, more akin to Heidegger’s views than he thinks. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concepts of writing and authorship in Plato are associated with monologism and absence rather than presence. The Phaedrus objects to writing precisely insofar as it creates that unre sponsive figure in the field of discursive which we have subsequently called the 'author'. The dialectical preference for question-and-answer is designed to resist anything resembling an author from entering the field of knowledge: the Socratic method resists monologism on epistemological and ethical grounds. However, the Platonic dialogues are (...) split in their signature between a Socrates who speaks and a Socrates who writes. As the Platonic oeuvre increases, so it moves from graphic representation of the oral methods of Socrates to the status of a writing in its own terms. The Phaedrus is a crucial statement in this cultural tran sition. So, far from simply condemning writing, the dialogue accepts Plato's growth as an author of written compositions and his growing sense of himself as an author. What tradition has registered as 'the Socratic problem' can be reviewed according to this competition between the orality of the master and the writerly practices of his pupil. Between dialogism and monologism, speech and writing, absence and presence, Socrates and Plato, the concept of the author is generated. The Plato of the Phaedrus wants to grasp, to theorize, this new figure emerg ing on the chirographic horizons, one whom he would recognize less in Socrates, 'Homer' or Pythagoras than in the mirror of his own text. (shrink)

Táto štúdia ponúka stručné uvedenie do sokratovskej otázky, pričom sa v nej kladie dôraz predovšetkým na Platónovho Sókrata. Prvá časť príspevku sleduje vznik sókratovskej otázky v antike. V druhej časti sa pojednáva o vzostupe Platónovej autority v riešení tejto otázky. Nasledujúca časť podáva argumenty, prečo je Platónov portrét Sókrata z pohľadu historika filozofie neudržateľný a nedôveryhodný. Navrhované riešenia sókratovského problému spočívajú v zdržaní sa úsudku o historickej autentickosti Platónovho Sókrata.

The aim of the present paper is to discuss Socrates’ idea of philosophy asa service to the god. First the article investigates why Chaerephon wentto Delphi and why he asked Pythia the famous question concerningSocrates. The investigation provides a basis for distinguishing two majorperiods in his activity. The one preceding the Delphic oracle consists inconducting inquiries in a group of closest friends. The one following theDelphic oracle consist in addressing a much larger audience. An analysisof both periods suggests that the (...) oracle from Delphi greatly affectedSocrates’ relations with other Athenians. While the present article dealsalso with the issue of Socrates’ daimonion, it hypothesizes that the voiceof daimonion and the voice of Pythia could be regarded as Apollo’sinterventions. (shrink)

We suggest a certain minimal approach to the historical Socrates on the basis of Plato’s Apology. This text makes it possible to reconstruct the authentic charge and the defense line of Socrates, as well as his motivation and the quintessence of his philosophical challenge. The most important thing is what the philosopher says in the face of his death sentence: that the greatest good for a man is to live an examined life focusing on virtues and ethical values. Unfortunately, the (...) preponderance of studies, even the most recent ones, fail to recognize the philosopher’s provocative challenge, whilst it is not only a crucial motif in the Socratic examining, i.e. testing the interlocutors’ knowledge by means of irony, elenchos and aporia, but also an inspiration for his direct and indirect followers in seeking virtues and the greatest good. (shrink)

This paper offers an innovative interpretation of Socrates’ disavowal of being a teacher as well as a new way of understanding Plato’s depiction of sophistry. The author identifies two different types of sophists, forthrightly frivolous sophists and slyly flattering sophists, in order to compare the pedagogical methods and political motives of each of these two types of sophists with those of Plato’s Socrates. In the course of this comparison it is made clear that Socrates endeavours to be not a teacher (...) but a ‘cowherder’, to use Plato’s agricultural hunger imagery. He rejects the conventional pedagogy that endeavours to ‘feed’ information to students. Instead he fosters learning by putting students in a position to think ideas through for themselves, just as a cowherder puts the herd out to graze in the pasture. This pedagogy alone has the potential to produce citizens who assume responsibility for their own education. (shrink)

This dissertation deals with the tragic vision that motivates certain key aspects of Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy. While in the formative early work, the Dialectic of Enlightenment, co-written with Max Horkheimer, the tragic views are clear, in later works, such as the Aesthetic Theory and the Negative Dialectics, they are only implicit. The study reconstructs the tragic vision found in the Dialectic of Enlightenment and uses it as a key to understand Adorno’s mature philosophy. A tragic vision is born when (...) specific philosophical convictions regarding agency and morality coalesce with certain ethical and political conditions. A tragic vision forms the grounds for tragic views. For Adorno, the key convictions rise out of the failures of reason and culture to enable the eradication of unnecessary suffering by creating the kind of conditions in which human beings could flourish. These convictions give rise to a view of humanity as blind to its own shortcomings and thus doomed to perpetuate suffering in the name of progress and growth. Adorno’s persistent negativism prevents him from offering practical solutions for changing the world, but he does offer a scathing critique of the modern world that continues to resonate with new generations of readers. The analysis of the tragic vision presented in this dissertation will highlight the fundamental philosophical and ethical commitments underlying Adorno’s views and will thus allow both situating his work into a larger cultural context and juxtaposing it with the work of other philosophers, as well as other writers, thereby opening new vistas for research not just on Adorno but on continental philosophy, social theory, and the domain of arts and letters at large. (shrink)