This paper presents a new anti-criterialist view, Brutal Personal Identity (BPI). According to BPI, personal identity is a quasi-fundamental fact, which is metaphysically grounded in brute facts about absolutely fundamental personhood. By reversing the order of metaphysical explanation, BPI is not a form of identity mysticism as Dean Zimmerman asserts. Instead, BPI has even the potential to lay a solid foundation for developing an appropriate account of mentality and first-person perspectives. Furthermore, a comparison between BPI and soul theory is provided (...) to show why BPI is better than its main anti-criterialist rival. This provides us a compelling reason for considering BPI in the debate over personal identity. (shrink)

One of the main problems of the soul theory is how the soul, which has no material properties, interacts with body. Because it is difficult to understand how an immaterial being interacts with matter. In particular, as our scientific understanding of the way the brain works and how it affects our psychology expands, the question of whether a soul is needed for the mind manifests itself more strongly. In this context, current data on the close connection between the brain and (...) the mind is often used as an objection to the understanding of the soul. One of the recent data that has been claimed to have dealt a heavy blow against the understanding of the soul is the split-brain case. The split-brain case is the name given to the condition of patients whose brain hemispheres are surgically separated from each other. The difference of this case from other cases used against dualism is that it pointed out that the integrity of consciousness also depends on the brain. Because although there was a connection between many mental functions and the brain before, it was not between the unity of consciousness. For it was a new claim that the unity of consciousness also depends on the brain. On the contrary, arguments were used in favor of the existence of the soul, stating that the brain cannot provide the unity of consciousness due to its multi-part structure, and therefore an indivisible soul is necessary. Whereas, in the split-brain case, patients whose brain hemispheres were separated from each other could think and act like two different people. This is interpreted as contrary to the soul view, which argues that the individual and the soul are indivisible. The present study considers whether the split-brain case does indeed offer a strong argument against dualism. In this paper, first of all, more detailed information about the split-brain case will be given. Then, the arguments of those who use this case against dualism and why the issue seems problematic in terms of the soul view will be discussed. Afterwards, some solutions offered by dualists to this problem will be evaluated. There are three different strategies that dualists follow at this point. The first one rejects the idea that consciousness is divided as a result of the split-brain phenomenon, the second rejects the idea that the soul is indivisible, and the third way accepts both, but argues that they are not contradictory, because a single soul can have a divided consciousness. This paper argues that even if it is accepted that more than one stream of consciousness emerges as a result of the split-brain case, this cannot be seen as a finishing blow to dualism. Despite this, the case in question can be regarded as a strong argument against dualism. For a counter-argument to be strong, it does not need to conclusively demonstrate the falsity of what it opposes. It suffices to show the weakness of its probability of being true. In this respect, the split-brain case greatly weakens the probability of dualism being true. (shrink)

First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject exists within an organism and has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but is not morally responsible for the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I argue that it's a live possibility that typical adult humans contain non-agential subjects. Finally, I argue that, if there are non-agential subjects, this has important and surprising implications for a variety of ethical issues. Accordingly, ethicists should pay more attention to whether (...) there are non-agential subjects and what their implications for ethics would be. (shrink)