Five dimensions of amusement are ethically searched: incongruity, perspectivity, dissociation, enjoyment, and freshness. Amusement perceives incongruities and virtues are formally congruities between one's character and one's nature. An ethical sense of humor is a sense for incongruities between people's behavior and character, and their telos. To appreciate any humor one must adopt a perspective, and in the case of ethical amusement this is the standpoint of one who possesses the virtues. In being amused at the incongruity of some human foible, (...) one is dissociated from it, and adopts a ?higher? perspective. Thus a sense of humor about one's own foibles is a capacity of character?transcendence; but character?transcendence is basic to the very concept of a moral virtue. The prima facie moral dubiousness of enjoying failures of human fulfilment leads to placing certain restrictions on such enjoyment: a sense of humor cannot be a virtue unless allied with compassion and hope. Finally, amusement implies a certain vivacity of perception of the incongruity in question. It is thus a way, not merely of knowing or judging that certain things are fitting and others not, but of ?seeing? that. (shrink)

This article provides an analysis of how the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, particularly their treatment of the "Problem of the One and the Many," can help inform Sam Harris's attempt to ground ethics in the empirical sciences in his 2010 book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. -/- The paper shows how Aristotle and Aquinas's thought can: • Explaining how the sciences are organized and why they will not produce multiple, competing measures of goodness (...) and well-being; • Resolving the “moral paradoxes” that Harris finds himself unable to find a solution to, by demonstrating how the human good essentially involves a “common good,” and how goodness always relates to the whole; • Providing us with a better explanation for why selfless behavior is good and why it is “good for us” to be virtuous; • Providing Harris with a better definition of freedom as self-determination; and • Showing how neither a recognition that the sciences must play a major role in ethics, nor naturalistic explanations of human behavior, need to preclude our orientation towards a transcendent good. (shrink)

Does the self exist? If so, what is its nature? How long do selves last? Galen Strawson draws on literature and psychology as well as philosophy to discuss various ways we experience having or being a self. He argues that it is legitimate to say that there is such a thing as the self, distinct from the human being.

Tolstoy's Iván Ilých lies near death, regretting a terrible life but unaware of what he could have done differently while alive. Although motivated to work for all the wrong reasons-money, self-esteem, social acceptance, and escape from home-by all formal accounts he has been a highly responsible professional. This analysis of a work about work illustrates the relationship between meaningful work, professional responsibility, and meaningful life.

This article develops a phenomenological exploration of chronic pain from a first-person perspective that can serve to enrich the medical third-person perspective. The experience of chronic pain is found to be a feeling in which we become alienated from the workings of our own bodies. The bodily-based mood of alienation is extended, however, in penetrating the whole world of the chronic pain sufferer, making her entire life unhomelike. Furthermore, the pain mood not only opens up the world as having an (...) alien quality, it also makes the world more lonesome and poor by forcing the sufferer to attend to the workings of her own body. To suffer pain is to find oneself in a situation of passivity in relation to the hurtful experiences one is undergoing. In making the body and the world more unhomelike places to be in, pain also tends to rob a person of her language. Severe pain is hard to describe because it pushes the person towards the borderlines of imaginable experience and because it makes it hard to see any meaning and purpose in the situation one has been forced into. The analysis of chronic pain in the article is guided by the attempts made by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Martin Heidegger to understand the nature of human embodiment and existence, and also by descriptions of chronic pain found in the Swedish author Lars Gustafsson’s novel The Death of a Beekeeper. (shrink)

Abstract“Reading as if for Death” asks how people live in the face of imminent death by analyzing Nevil Shute’s 1957 novel On the Beach. The few critics who have commented on this novel have focused on its message about the dangers of nuclear weapons. This article argues that this middlebrow Australian bestseller, which has never gone out of print, is also an important contribution to the literature of death and dying. In its focus on characters who may well be dead (...) within a year but continue to plant gardens and learn shorthand, the novel departs from common views of everyday life as passive, static, and immanent, instead portraying it as centered around acts of repair and future-oriented planning. In contrast to representations of mortality that emphasize transcendence and enlightenment, On the Beach sympathetically conveys the combination of certainty and uncertainty that most of its characters endure in living their final days and depicts characters for whom denial, refusing to see what is, and delusion, believing in what is not, become forms of palliative care. (shrink)

Long-term cancer survivorship is an emerging field that focuses on physical late-effects and psychosocial implications for the inflicted. This study wishes to cast light on the underlying ontological aspect of long-term survivorship by philosophically exploring how being in life post cancer is perceived by survivors. Sixteen in-depth interviews with 14 Danish cancer survivors were conducted by the author. Having faced a life-threatening disease but no longer being in imminent danger of dying, survivors still considered death a defining yet dynamic component (...) in their approach to life as a moving toward the end, sparking a sense of vitality in mortality. In order to unfold the interviewees’ renewed existential understanding post cancer, this study employs Martin Heidegger’s ontological analysis of death. In survivorship, my participants can thus be understood as being left with the perpetual choice between living in inauthenticity or in authenticity. The difference between the two modes of existence exhibits two diverging ways of relating to death, self, and being-in-the-world. At the same time, the role of death in long-term survivorship reflects back on the magnitude of the initial existential and moral upheaval triggered by the cancer diagnosis. Understanding the role of death in long-term survivorship can positively inform the field of cancer rehabilitation and long-term survivor care. (shrink)

While all psychologically competent persons know that they will one day die, this knowledge is typically held at a distance, not fully assimilated. That is, while we do not doubt that we will die, there is another sense in which we cannot fully believe it either. However, on some rare occasions, we can grasp the reality of our mortal nature in a way that is seemingly revelatory, as if the fact is appreciated in a new way. Thomas Nagel calls this (...) experience ‘the expectation of nothingness’. But how can I be shocked by what I already know? After illustrating this phenomenon via examples including Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich, I draw on the work of Thomas Nagel, Tamar Szabo Gendler, Mark Johnston and others to articulate and explain our typical state of believing-yet-not-believing in our inevitable death, and offer a hypothesis as to how this condition is occasionally overcome, so that we grasp our mortality in a more psychologically integrated manner. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the creative interaction between Ivan Bunin and Lev Shestov. After providing constructive feedback on observations and reflections from the preceding scholarly literature on the subject the author argues that the main point of convergence between the writer and the philosopher is their works on Leo Tolstoy. The study includes a textual analysis of the elements of Shestovian discourse that were discovered in Bunin’s essay The Liberation of Tolstoy. The author argues that the ending of The Liberation of (...) Tolstoy can be understood only in the context of existentialist discourse. Bunin's objections to the Shestov's view of Chekhov’s creative work have been studied in detail. In general, Bunin does not appear to be a “disciple” of Shestov, as he is engaged in a philosophical dialogue with him on equal terms. Existentialism is the closest philosophical tradition to Bunin’s thought than any others that arose in the twentieth century. (shrink)

This research is about altruism. In our first chapter, our quest to find whether we are essentially altruistic starts with questioning particular ways of inquiry and proposes a philosophy of unbracketing. In our second chapter, we realise that our proposal starts with an imperative – a prescription. We begin by meditating on the phenomenon of prescription which seems to precede all ways of inquiry. Our analysis of prescription reveals that altruism is to prescribe oneself towards an Other. This type of (...) prescription is to promise a future for an Other. To promise is to give one’s word and to undertake to realising it. In our third chapter, we explore the act of “giving one’s word.” To give one’s word is beyond a speech act. In fact, it is to give one’s logos. An altruistic attempt is carried out in this chapter to liberate ‘logos’ from particular conceptions and allow for its universal meaning to emerge. Logos is traced back to its inceptual conception as existence or will to power – a will to future. This philosophical excavation leads us to our fourth chapter where we re-encounter our original paradox. That is, while human reality starts with a promise of helping someone to make sense – to understand – we have been trying to understand understanding, or how we make sense, by removing the Other and by focusing only on subjective conditions. In this chapter, we reveal how to understand an Other is an altruistic act. In our final chapter, we carefully observe that human existence is a gift from the Other. We describe this gift as a metaphysical passage from being to existence – an altruistic act. A passage which is created by an Other who promises to give us the means to be able to create meaning, that is to say, to exist. (shrink)

In an overview of the essays in this project, a number of clinical ethics issues receive emphasis. (1) One cluster concerns the ethical concerns presented within the relationship between the providers (doctor, nurse, etc.) and patient (and family), as distinct from those associated with being a clinical ethics consultant invited into a situation to assist. (2) Distinct from these are ethical issues intrinsic to the ways in which clinical encounters are variously written about (from chart notes to published articles). (3) (...) Finally, there is a set of issues connected with the major characteristics of clinical encounters, in view of which it is imperative to be specifically attentive to the fine details and complex interactions among patient, doctor, family, and others, within a specific social context. Keeping these matters in mind helps to clarify the differences between consulting (talking and listening) and writing about consultations, as well as among the various kinds of writing about clinical encounters. (shrink)

Abraham Verghese proposes to renew medicine by training physicians to read the right texts—literary fiction and patients' bodies—with skilled attention. Analyzing Verghese's proposal with reference to Foucault's idea of the "clinical gaze," I find that Verghese conceives of patients as texts that only physicians can read, meaning that physicians become the storytellers of the bodies, lives, and deaths of the people they meet as patients. I conclude that Verghese's project is unsustainable and alternatively propose thinking analogically of physicians as ship (...) captains who maintain therapeutic distance to reopen interpretative spaces for communities outside of medicine. (shrink)

The well-established techniques of the professional storyteller not only have the potential to model complex “truth” but also to dig deeply into that complexity, thereby perhaps getting closer to that truth. This applies not only to fiction, but also to medicine and even science. Compelling storytelling ability may have conferred an evolutionary survival advantage and, if so, is likely represented in the neural circuitry of the human brain. Functional imaging will likely point to a neuroanatomical basis for compelling storytelling ability; (...) this will presumably reflect underlying cellular and molecular mechanisms. (shrink)