Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment.. Secondly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a (...) dialectical concept which connects ‘impulse’ and ‘habit’, ‘original’ or ‘native’ and ‘acquired’ nature, ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing ‘routine’ and ‘art’ as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies. (shrink)

Recent discussions of Hegel’s conception of second nature, specifically focused on Hegel’s notion of habit, have greatly advanced our understanding of Hegel’s views on embodied normativity. This essay examines Hegel’s account of embodied normativity in relation to his assessment of good and bad habits. Engaging Hegel’s account of the rabble in the Philosophy of Right and Frank Ruda’s assessment of Hegel’s rabble, this essay traces the relation between ethicality, idleness and race in Hegel. In embodying a position of refusal in (...) its affirmation of idleness, the rabble disallows the progressive revision of the project of modernity central to Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel’s discussion of the rabble is thus key to assessing the production of race within Hegel’s notion of ethical life. (shrink)

Recent discussions of Hegel's conception of second nature, specifically focused on Hegel's notion of habit (Gewohnheit), have greatly advanced our understanding of Hegel's views on embodied normativity. This essay examines Hegel's account of embodied normativity in relation to his assessment of good and bad habits. Engaging Hegel's account of the rabble (Pöbel) in thePhilosophy of Rightand Frank Ruda's assessment of Hegel's rabble, this essay traces the relation between ethicality, idleness and race in Hegel. In being a figure of refusal in (...) its affirmation of idleness, the rabble disallows the progressive revision of the project of modernity central to Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's discussion of the rabble is thus key to assessing the production of race within Hegel's notion of ethical life. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAxel Honneth’s theory of recognition has been criticised for presenting a deficient concept of work and the normative significance of work. In recent years Jean-Philippe Deranty, among others, has suggested that Honneth could overcome this deficiency by reintroducing into his mature theory the critical concept of work that first appeared in his 1977–1985 writings. My paper critically reconstructs and assesses Deranty’s position. I argue that Deranty has understated the extent to which his research direction diverges from Honneth’s. Rather than simply (...) nuancing Honneth’s existing philosophical system, Deranty’s work exposes some of its conceptual limits and points beyond it. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer a corrective to the standard reading of Hegel as a social constructivist when it comes to matters of the self by shifting the focus from the Phenomenology to his ‘Philosophy of Spirit’ and ‘Anthropology.’ There, a kind-of self or Selbstischkeit is revealed, anticipating the pre-reflective, experiential of the likes of Zahavi and, by extension, Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Hegel's conception of the self enhances our understanding of the relationship between the pre-reflective, experiential (...) self and the self of self-consciousness, contributing to the discourse on the continuity between biological and mental life. The self, as it emerges in consciousness, traces its origins to a primarily bodily selfness which is foundational to psychical life. Habit emerges as a vital bridge between this selfness and the self of self-consciousness, offering a dynamic, dialectical framework for thinking the development of the self of self-consciousness in and out of its bodily context. (shrink)

I Ville verdier oppfordrer Sigurd Hverven til å anerkjenne at planter, dyr, arter og naturområder på jorda i løpet av naturhistorien har oppnådd et mylder av verdier. I senere tid har mennesker fått makten til å ødelegge mange av disse naturverdiene. Det gir oss som lever nå et nytt ansvar for naturen. I boka undersøker Hverven hvordan mennesker kan erkjenne natur, hva natur er og om naturen har verdi i seg selv. Tankegangen munner ut i et historisk forankret imperativ: Tenkning (...) og praksis må innrettes slik at jordas verdifulle evne til å frembringe og opprettholde mangfold ikke skades ytterligere. (shrink)

A recently widely accepted view has it that the nature-spirit distinction in Hegel is to be understood as a distinction between a space or realm that is not normative or does not involve norms, and one that is or does. Notwithstanding the merits of this view, it has tended to create a separation between nature and spirit which is both philosophically troubling and difficult to reconcile with the picture of Hegel as the arch enemy of abstract or unreconciled dualisms. In (...) this paper I aim to show that the defining phenomenon for this view—collective self-government by norms—is on Hegel’s account both dependent on living nature that involves normativity broadly conceived all the way down and also subject to the normative or evaluative super-principle of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit—concrete freedom—the essence of spirit according to him. This is to say that for Hegel the normativity of collectively administered norms is neither the most basic nor the highest form of normativity. -/- Published online first 27 January 2021. (shrink)