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  1. Brentano on the Individuation of Mental Acts.Hamid Taieb - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):431-444.
    This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano’s account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul”, and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his “reistic” (...)
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  • Phenomenal intentionality, inner awareness, and the given.David Woodruff Smith - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10059-10076.
    Responding to the myth of a purely sensuous “given”, we turn to phenomenology, to the structure of consciousness in an everyday perception of an everyday object. We first consider Brentano’s model of an act of consciousness: featuring the presentation of an object “intentionally” contained “in” the act, joined by the presentation of that object-presentation in “inner consciousness”. We then dig into Husserl’s intricate “semantic” theory of intentionality: featuring “noematic” meaning within a “horizon” of implicated meaning regarding the object of perceptual (...)
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  • Der Gegenstandsbegriff als terminologische Hürde für Brentanos Konzeption intentionaler Inexistenz.Johannes L. Brandl - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):131-150.
    Brentano’s use of the expression ‘intentional inexistence’ poses a considerable terminological problem. This is due not only to the expressions ‘intentional’ and ‘inexistence’ contained in it. The biggest hurdle is the liberal use of the expression ‘object’, which is encouraged by Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistent (or immanent) objects. Carlo Ierna tries to meet this problem with a strategy that allows to hold on to the notion of intentional inexistence without accepting immanent objects. The originality of his interpretation lies, as (...)
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