Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The first-order logic of CZF is intuitionistic first-order logic.Robert Passmann - 2024 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 89 (1):308-330.
    We prove that the first-order logic of CZF is intuitionistic first-order logic. To do so, we introduce a new model of transfinite computation (Set Register Machines) and combine the resulting notion of realisability with Beth semantics. On the way, we also show that the propositional admissible rules of CZF are exactly those of intuitionistic propositional logic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Relativized ordinal analysis: The case of Power Kripke–Platek set theory.Michael Rathjen - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):316-339.
    The paper relativizes the method of ordinal analysis developed for Kripke–Platek set theory to theories which have the power set axiom. We show that it is possible to use this technique to extract information about Power Kripke–Platek set theory, KP.As an application it is shown that whenever KP+AC proves a ΠP2 statement then it holds true in the segment Vτ of the von Neumann hierarchy, where τ stands for the Bachmann–Howard ordinal.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • From the weak to the strong existence property.Michael Rathjen - 2012 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (10):1400-1418.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Constructive Ackermann's interpretation.Hanul Jeon - 2022 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 173 (5):103086.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Strength of some Semi-Constructive Theories.Solomon Feferman - 2012 - In Ulrich Berger, Hannes Diener, Peter Schuster & Monika Seisenberger (eds.), Logic, Construction, Computation. De Gruyter. pp. 201-226.
    Most axiomatizations of set theory that have been treated metamathematically have been based either entirely on classical logic or entirely on intuitionistic logic. But a natural conception of the settheoretic universe is as an indefinite (or “potential”) totality, to which intuitionistic logic is more appropriately applied, while each set is taken to be a definite (or “completed”) totality, for which classical logic is appropriate; so on that view, set theory should be axiomatized on some correspondingly mixed basis. Similarly, in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations