This paper presents a taxonomy of divisibilism, a philosophical perspective advocating for the infinite divisibility of continua. The taxonomy is founded on various conceptualizations of indivisibles, enabling the identification of two types of divisibilism: ‘moderate’ and ‘strong’. The former denies indivisibles as constituent parts of magnitudes, whereas the latter rejects indivisibles as even intrinsic elements (such as limits or junctions) of magnitudes. The paper proceeds to demonstrate how Gregory of Rimini falls into the second category, utilizing geometry and non-entitism as (...) primary tools to dismiss the very possibility of the existence of indivisibles. Within the framework of this ‘strong divisibilism’, the paper also examines Gregory’s interpretation of mathematical items (e.g. points, lines, surfaces) against the backdrop of one of his main sources, that is, Augustine. Lastly, the paper delves into Gregory’s interpretation of the fundamental Aristotelian divisibilist claim, namely, that a continuum is infinitely divisible. It highlights how Gregory’s stance ultimately conflicts with Aristotelian premises, particularly concerning his assertion that the division of all continua is made into infinitely many actual parts. (shrink)