Die vorliegende Studie zeigt, dass Aristoteles eine originelle Konzeption der Zurechnung entwickelt, auch wenn er noch über keinen Ausdruck für Zurechnung verfügt. Die Frage nach der Zurechnung ist zu verstehen als die Frage danach, (i) unter welchen Bedingungen und zu welchem Grad Handlungen einem Akteur als seine eigenen Handlungen, für die er (moralisch) verantwortlich ist, zurechenbar sind und (ii) inwieweit ein Akteur auch für seine Dispositionen, die seinen Handlungen zugrunde liegen, verantwortlich ist. Aristoteles’ Konzeption ist innovativ, weil er Willentlichkeit weder (...) als notwendige noch als hinreichende Bedingung für Zurechenbarkeit erweist und weil er nicht nur Handlungen, sondern auch Dispositionen, die Handlungen zugrunde liegen, als Zurechnungsgegenstände auffasst. Die Studie macht die Vielschichtigkeit und Graduierbarkeit des aristotelischen Zurechnungsbegriffs sichtbar, indem sie die Konzeption der Zurechnung auf besondere Arten von Handlungen wie z.B. plötzliche Handlungen, Handlungen aus Zorn (thymos) oder akratische Handlungen anwendet. In systematischer Hinsicht stellt die Studie Bezüge zu Gegenwartspositionen her und zeigt, dass die aristotetelische Position auch für aktuelle Debatten anschlussfähig ist. (shrink)

The specific role of empeiria in Aristotle’s ethics has received much less attention than its role in his epistemology, despite the fact that Aristotle explicitly stresses the importance of empeiria as a requirement for the receptivity to ethical arguments and as a source for the formation of phronêsis.1 Thus, while empeiria is an integral part of all explanations that scholars give of the Aristotelian account of the acquisition of technê and epistêmê, it is usually not prominent in explanations of the (...) acquisition of phronêsis.2 The abundant mentions of empeiria in Aristotle’s ethical treatises are often eclipsed in the secondary literature... (shrink)

What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism (...) as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Aristotelian phronesis and aims at highlighting its nature as an eye on particulars with general ends in sight. More specifically, it challenges the particularistic interpretation of phronesis and Aristotelian ethics in order to argue for a “qualified generalism.” After sketching a radical Particularistic Reading (PR), the paper defends an interpretation it calls the Priority of Particulars Reading (PPR). First, it shows how PPR effectively accounts for the Aristotelian priority assigned to practical perception while at the same (...) time counterbalancing that priority by means of two interpretive strategies. Then it offers further support to PPR by appealing to its own reading of Aristotle's phronesis. It aims to show that it is possible to defend a legitimate form of PPR without ending in holding PR, and that Aristotle's own theory and work ground the moderate reading. Finally, it draws some implications by analyzing educational practice. (shrink)

In his recent paper on Aristotelian dialectic, Professor Hamlyn claims that ‘what may be important for Aristotle's purposes is not the truth but the acceptance of the truth’ . Dialectic is protreptic, and not strictly philosophical, spadework: ‘[t]he appeal to endoxa is, as it were, a setting of the scene, providing the context for argument out of which, it is hoped, will emerge the insights from which demonstration and thus further understanding can follow’.

Prohairesis plays a central role in Aristotle's moral psychology. It is prohairesis that determines an action to be rational, that provides the proximate efficient or moving cause of rational action, and that better reveals one's character than the action itself. This paper will discuss Aristotle's shifted emphases when speaking of prohairesis in different ethical treatises; Aristotle's pursuit of the nature of prohairesis and his special argumentative strategy in dealing with prohairesis; the structure, i.e., the desiderative and deliberative components of prohairesis; (...) and will conclude with some remarks about the significance of prohairesis. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 60 - 87 Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish, to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she (...) is oblivious of it. (shrink)