There are cases in which the literal interpretation of statutes may lead to counterintuitive consequences. When such cases go to high courts, judges may handle these counterintuitive consequences by identifying problematic rule conditions. Given that the law consists of a large number of rule conditions, it is demanding and exhaustive to figure out which condition is problematic. For solving this problem, our work aims to assist judges in civil law systems to resolve counterintuitive consequences using logic program representation of statutes (...) and Legal Debugging. The core principle of Legal Debugging is to cooperate with a user to find a culprit, a root cause of counterintuitive consequences. This article proposes an algorithm to resolve a culprit. Since the statutes are represented by logic rules but changes in law are initiated by cases, we adopt a prototypical case with judgement specified by a set of rules. Then, to resolve a culprit, we reconstruct a program so that it provides reasons as if we applied case-based reasoning to a new set of prototypical cases with judgement, which include a new set of facts relevant to a considering case. (shrink)

This paper describes an approach for reasoning in a dynamic domain with nondeterministic actions in which an agent’s beliefs correspond to the simplest, or most plausible, course of events consistent with the agent’s observations and beliefs. The account is based on an epistemic extension of the situation calculus, a first-order theory of reasoning about action that accommodates sensing actions. In particular, the account is based on a qualitative theory of nondeterminism. Our position is that for commonsense reasoning, the world is (...) most usefully regarded as deterministic, and that nondeterminism is an epistemic phenomenon, arising from an agent’s limited awareness and perception. The account offers several advantages: an agent has a set of categorical beliefs, yet can deal with equally-likely outcomes or with outcomes of differing plausibility. The agent maintains as its set of contingent beliefs the most plausible, or simplest, picture of the world, consistent with its beliefs and actions it believes it executed; yet it may modify these in light of later information. (shrink)