In this paper I propose an interpretation of Kant’s notion of the highest good which bears political, ethical, and religious layers simultaneously. I argue that a proper analysis of what Kant allows us to hope for necessarily involves what we should hope for as moral agents. I argue that Kant’s conception of the highest good plays a crucial role in his moral theory as it designates the ideal “context” of moral experience which can be described as “a moral world”. Each (...) of these three layers or aspects of the moral world (i.e., political, ethical, and religious) as the interrelated contexts in and through which we realize our moral agency is inextricably linked with the highest good. Without any dichotomy between secular or religious conceptualization of the highest good, in the political and in certain aspects of the ethical contexts we should adopt certain hopes as an implicit aspect of being virtuous, whereas from a religious perspective we are able to, and we may legitimately adopt hope and faith about the cosmic/ teleological context of our moral experience. (shrink)

In the Groundwork, we find three distinct conceptions of freedom: (i) A negative conception of freedom, understood as a capacity for spontaneous action independent of alien causes; (ii) a positive conception of freedom, understood as the capacity of giving law to oneself; and (iii) a second positive conception, understood as the capacity to give laws that bind others as well as oneself. The dominant interpretation of Kant ignores this third conception of freedom and interprets the second conception as a capacity (...) for self-determination or self-governance, which is seen as the most basic and important Kantian conception of autonomy. In this paper, we will focus mainly on explaining the distinction between the second and third conceptions of autonomy and will defend the claim that the third conception is morally the most basic. We will also explain briefly why Kant thinks that having the capacity for citizenship is necessary for having the capacity for self-governance. (shrink)

This paper aims at shedding light on an obscure point in Kant's theory of the state. It discusses whether Kant's rational theory of the state recognises the fact that certain exceptional social situations, such as the extreme poverty of some parts of the population, could request institutional state support in order to guarantee the attainment of a minimum threshold of civil independence. It has three aims: 1) to show that Kant's Doctrine of Right can offer solutions for the complex relation (...) between economics and politics in our present time; 2) to demonstrate the claim that Kant embraces a pragmatic standpoint when he tackles the social concerns of the state, and so to refute the idea that he argues for an abstract conception of politics; and 3) to suggest that a non-paternalistic theory of rights is not necessarily incompatible with the basic tenets of a welfare state. O presente artigo tenciona contribuir a esclarecer uma questão, tão complicada quanto polêmica, no âmbito da teoria kantiana do Estado de direito. Pretendo submeter à discussão se a teoria racional de Kant sobre o Estado legal sustenta ou rejeita o fato de que certas situações sociais excepcionais, como a extrema pobreza de uma parte da população, requerem o apoio institucional do Estado para garantir a consecução de um limiar mínimo de independência civil. Proponho-me os três seguintes objetivos: 1) argumentar a capacidade da doutrina kantiana do direito para propor soluções para a difícil relação entre economia e política, no tempo presente; 2) mostrar que o ponto de vista pragmático que Kant adota quando analisa as preocupações sociais do Estado recusa a ideia segundo a qual Kant sustenta uma concepção abstrata da política e 3) sugerir a tese de uma teoria não paternalista do Estado de direito sem ter que renunciar necessariamente aos princípios básicos do welfare state. (shrink)