In Book 1 of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus contends two major claims: (1) justice is the advantage of the stronger, and (2) justice is the good of the other, while injustice is to one’s own profit and advantage. In the beginning of Book II, Glaucon self-proclaims that he will be representing Thrasymachus’ claims in a better way, and provides a story of how justice has originated from a state of nature situation. However, Glaucon’s story of the origin of justice has an (...) implication that justice is the advantage of the weak rather than the stronger. This is inconsistent with Thrasymachus’ first claim which states that justice is the advantage of the stronger. This is a problem for Glaucon since Glaucon is supposed to be representing Thrasymachus’ original claims in a better way. In this paper, I provide two solutions to this puzzle with the help of elementary game theory. (shrink)

Appeals to nature are ubiquitous in Epicurean ethics and politics. The foundation of Epicurean ethics is its claim that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and pain the sole intrinsic evil, and this is supposedly shown by the behavior of infants who have not yet been corrupted, "when nature's judgement is pure and whole." Central to their recommendations about how to attain pleasure is their division between types of desires: the natural and necessary ones, the natural but non-necessary ones, and (...) the vain and empty ones. Elsewhere, the Epicureans talk about the "natural goods" of political power and fame, and they contrast "natural wealth" with wealth as "defined by empty opinion." Finally, in their politics, Epicurus claims that the "the justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed." This paper explores two questions regarding these various appeals to nature. The first is: what is it for these things to be natural, i.e., what notion of "natural" or "nature" is at play here? (Furthermore, is there a single notion being used across these appeals, and if not, how are they related?) The second is: what normative work does a thing's being natural do? That is, what reason, if any, does a desire's being natural give me for pursuing the object of that desire and trying to fulfill that desire, as opposed to not doing so and trying to eliminate it, and similarly for the other appeals to nature? (shrink)

The Epicureans advocate a moderately ascetic lifestyle on instrumental grounds, as the most effective means to securing tranquility. The virtuous person will reduce his desires to what is natural and necessary in order to avoid the trouble and anxiety caused by excessive desire. So much is clear from Epicurus' general ethics. But the later Epicurean Philodemus fills in far more detail about the attitude a wise Epicurean will take toward wealth in his treatise On Property Management. This paper explores some (...) of Philodemus' distinctive doctrines and argues that Philodemus' position on crafts is an improvement on the Socratic and Aristotelian positions that he is reacting against. Philodemus rejects both constraints on what counts as a genuine craft proposed by Socrates in the Gorgias: that a craft aims at a genuine good, and that it is based on a grasp of the nature of its subject. Philodemus also rejects the attempts of Xenophon and Theophrastus to preserve an important place for the craft of property management, conceived of as aiming at maximizing your wealth, within the Socratic and Aristotelian ethical tradition that puts virtue and virtuous activity at the center of the happy life. According to Philodemus, cultivating and exercising the traditional technê of property management is actually incompatible with being a virtuous person and obtaining happiness. (shrink)

Lejos de ser lo político una cuestión secundaria o extraña a la filosofía epicúrea, se arguye de este ser un componente esencial de su pensamiento que se presenta en el trato de la amistad como rasgo característico e ineludible para el constructo social decara a los conflictos internos y externos de la Grecia del siglo IV a.C. Desde esta óptica, un interés por precisar el alcance ético-político de la φιλíα (filopolitismo) tan referido en la antigüedad, pero desde un filósofo al (...) que se le endilga la defensa de apoliticidad (O’Keefe,2010; Christensen, 2020), el actual estudio explora argumentos que hacen de ese término un fundamento práctico que ofrece las mejores condiciones para una vida social en tanto puede ofrendar patrones de conducta en lo que respecta a vínculos comunitarios. Para ello se recurre al análisis de textos que se conservan de Epicuro los cuales tienen un tratamiento de la amistad como la Carta a Meneceo (Ad Menoeceum), las Máximas Capitales (Ratæ Sententiae) y las Sentencias Vaticanas (Gnomologio Vaticano), pues se trata de un estudio documental el cual tiene por fin la revisión y análisis de fuentes bibliográficas. (shrink)

Epicurus held that justice came into being when individuals made compacts with one another to secure the benefit that comes from not harming one another. He also distinguished just laws from those that are not just; and he recognized a virtue of justice. This much is well supported by our evidence. There is also much that is controversial. At the very basis, there is disagreement on his conception of justice. There are also basic questions on how compacts are related to (...) the justice of laws, as well as to the virtue of justice. Plato and Aristotle severed compacts from virtue; and some modern thinkers consider the justice of institutions prior to that of individuals. What was Epicurus’ position? This paper will sketch an outline of Epicurus’ theory of justice as a path to the goal of a pleasant life. As Phillip Mitsis (1988) suggested, Epicurus sought to harmonize a contractual view of justice with the virtue of justice. My aim is to investigate further the coherence of this endeavor. As I will argue, Epicurus presents a unitary theory of justice, composed of a number of steps that develop out of each other in a consistent way. As a developmental path, it admits of much variation. By tracing its basic features, I seek to show how Epicurus puts individuals in charge of attaining their goal, pleasure. (shrink)

What would happen if we succeeded in ‘turning down’ our emotional reactions? In this paper I compare two conditions that play out the answer to this question in very different ways—the lived experience of flattened affect characteristic of depression, and the idealised emotional restraint of the tranquil Epicurean ataraxic. I use this comparison to develop a new proposed source of value for the presence of emotion in our ordinary lives: it feels good to feel like oneself, and there are facts (...) about our reflexive relationship to our emotional lives that provides one explanation of when and why we get to feel that way. (shrink)