I here defend microphysical manyism. According to microphysical manyism, each composite or higher-level object is a mere plurality of microphysical particles. After clarifying the commitments of the view, I offer two physicalist-friendly arguments in its favour. The first argument appeals to the Canberra Plan. Here I argue that microphysical particles acting in unison play the theoretical roles associated with composite objects - that they do everything that we think of composite objects as doing - and thus that composite objects are (...) to be identified with pluralities of microphysical particles. Along the way I rebut the objections that pluralities of particles don’t display the right emergent, ‘lingering’, or modal properties to be good candidates for identification with higher-level objects. In the second argument I claim that microphysical manyism is uniquely able to capture a compelling and widespread physicalist intuition concerning the intimate nature of the relationship between higher-level, composite objects and the microphysical world. (shrink)

One of the most characteristic cornerstones of Asay’s book, A Theory of Truthmaking, is the defense of what he calls the ontology-first perspective on what the truthmaker project is all about. He distinguishes it from and defends it over what he calls the explanation-first perspective, and he bases his overall theorizing about truthmaking on it. This critical notice aims to counter Asay’s challenges for the explanation-first perspective and reveal its theoretical advantages over its rival. First, I show how to escape (...) Asay’s presented dilemma for the explanation-first perspective by specifying the nature of the distinctive form of explanation that explanation-first truthmaker theorists should envisage. Second, partly based on my proposal in the preceding discussion, I provide an account of the cases that Asay thinks pose troubling questions concerning whether a certain entity really serves as the explanans of a truthmaking explanation. Third, I establish a way in which the explanation-first perspective can be beneficial to what the ontology-first perspective focuses on, namely, exploring the ontological requirements for truths. The overall discussion warns against the underestimation of the prospects for the explanation-first perspective. (shrink)