My plan in this article is to begin by raising the question of the point of judgements of beauty, and then to examine Kant's account of beauty in the third Critique from the perspective opened up by that question. Having raised the question of the point, I will argue, first, that there is an implied answer to it in Kant's text, and, second, that the answer is ultimately unsatisfying in that it falsely assumes that there is a ‘need’, or ‘task’, (...) or ‘purpose’, that we all necessarily share, to conceptualize all that encounters us in our experience, and fit it into one unified and comprehensive system. It is only against this assumption of our transcendental cognitive interest that Kant can so much as seem to have a real story to tell about where the value that we claim for things in calling them ‘beautiful’ derives from. This, in effect, means that to the extent that Kant offers us any answer at all to the question of the point of judgements of beauty, that answer testifies to his general neglect of the question of the point of judgements. And my purpose is to draw attention to that neglect, and to begin to assess its significance for Kant's transcendental project in general and for his conception of beauty in particular. (shrink)

Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, i.e., “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (p. 520). However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to follow, Horgan and (...) Tienson would first have to establish the co-variation of phenomenology and intentional content, but even so, phenomenal intentionality would still emerge as less plausible than its converse, representationalism. I will address these two challenges by appeal to Husserlian ideas. A consideration of perceptual phenomenology (i.e., phenomenal character) shows that there is a kind of perceptual content that is, indeed, determined by phenomenal character. Such content is conceived in terms of fulfillment conditions, or what it takes to bring aspects of objects and scenes to different, and more complete, ways of givenness. We can establish the primacy of phenomenology, relative to such fulfillment-conditional content, by tracing it back to the basic phenomenology of visual and other sensations. (shrink)

One of Kant’s central tenets concerning the human sciences is the claim that one need not, and should not, use a physiological vocabulary if one studies human cognitions, feelings, desires, and actions from the point of view of his ‘pragmatic’ anthropology. The claim is well known, but the arguments Kant advances for it have not been closely discussed. I argue against misguided interpretations of the claim, and I present his actual reasons in favor of it. Contemporary critics of a ‘physiological (...) anthropology’ reject physiological explanations of mental states as more or less epistemologically dubious. Kant does not favor such ignorance claims—and this is for the good, since none of these claims was sufficiently justified at that time. Instead, he develops an original irrelevance thesis concerning the empirical knowledge of the physiological basis of the mind. His arguments for this claim derive from his original and, up to now, little understood criticism of a certain conception of pragmatic history, related to his anthropological insights concerning our ability to create new rules of action, the social dynamics of human action, and the relative inconstancy of human nature. The irrelevance thesis also changes his views of the goal and methodology of anthropology. Kant thereby argues for a distinctive approach in quest for a general ‘science of man’.Keywords: Anthropology; Psychology; Psychophysiological explanations; Pragmatic history; Action explanation; Human nature. (shrink)

Heinrich Popitz’s Phenomena of Power aims to uncover power as “a universal component in the genesis and operation of human societies”. In order to uncover this “universal” concept of power, Popitz employs Husserl’s method of the “imaginative variation” [Phantasievariation]. Yet, contrary to phenomenology’s traditionally descriptive posture, Phenomena of Power’s project is at once descriptive and normative—seeking not only to describe power, but to also describe the way in which power can be remade. In the present paper it is argued that (...) this normative component of Popitz’s project offers the burgeoning field of critical phenomenology an illustration of the way in which Husserl’s “imaginative variation” might be employed not only as a descriptive tool of pure essences, but also as an instrument in the refashioning of social reality. (shrink)

After the publication of Wahrheit und Methode in 1960, Hans-Georg Gadamer, a celebrated student of Martin Heidegger, received rapidly a worldwide response for his intellectual genius by fusing different philosophical horizons into a coherent and rational perspective which he calls ‘philosophical hermeneutics.’ In his attempt to construct philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer criticizes historicism, romantic hermeneutics and modern subjectivism since they disregard ontological structure of historical understanding. By claiming that prejudgment (or fore-understanding) is the basis for a genuine understanding, he contends that (...) we can overcome false prejudgment only by having recourse to the subject matter of the texts and by understanding texts on the model of dialogue which happens between the partners questioning themselves on the basis of a subject (sache). For him, understanding oneself and others happens as an event of dialogue simply because understanding takes place within the world of language. Language gets concretized and temporalized by the give and take of words. In other words, language is not a mere system of signs, but rather is uncoveredness of beings and the way within which human Dasein realizes himself. Since historical tradition which supports every event of understanding discloses itself only within language and language is a matter of sharing and participating, understanding is historical and temporal. Here the words “historicity” and “temporality” do not refer merely to “being in the history and time.” This is to approach the event of understanding from chronological and universal notion of time. Historicity and temporality are basically the distinctiveness of disclosedness of beings. Philosophical thoughts, scientific theses, trends which effect the course of history constitute the historicity of understanding by creating a sort of discontinuity in the continuity of history. Hence historicity is the basis for the formation of fore understanding and prejudgment. Philosophical hermeneutics tries to show how the continuity of history and traditions occurs through discontinuity (historicity) of understanding. (shrink)

Phenomenology is often mistakenly understood as both introspectionist and anthropocentric and thus as incapable of providing us with objective knowledge. While clearly wrong, such critiques force us to spell out how the _life world_ that is given in human experience is in fact not anthropocentric and not incompatible with science. In this article we address this by adapting a recent proposal to extend the key methodological principle of cognitive semiotics, _phenomenological triangulation_, along two planes. The first is horizontal and concerns (...) the dimensions of Self, Others and Things, as irreducibly interrelated dimensions of the life world. The second is vertical, and deals with the way phenomena are accessed: from a first-person (philosophical), second-person (empirical in a qualitative sense) and third-person (scientific in a quantitative sense) perspective. With each perspective, the life world becomes correspondingly extended beyond direct experience. It is thus neither static nor confining. We exemplify each step with corresponding research, also providing examples of how non-human animals and not only human beings may serve as Others, thus addressing the critique of anthropocentrism. We conclude by pointing out how, despite some theoretical differences, the focus on subjectivity and the explicit or implicit adoption of the principle of phenomenological triangulation can serve as common ground for cognitive semiotics and biosemiotics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine Frege’s view of the context principle in his mature philosophical doctrine. Here, the author argues that the context principle is embodied in the contextual explanation of value-ranges presented in Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The contextual explanation of value-ranges plays essentially the same role as the context principle in The Foundations of Arithmetic. It is supposed to show how a reference to natural numbers is possible. Moreover, the author argues against the view that (...) the context principle should be separated from the recarving thesis. This aspect of Frege’s view leads the author to the rejection of the purely referential view of the context principle, which is fairly widely accepted in the current literature. (shrink)

Anthropology was a new field of study when Kant first began lecturing on it in 1772, and Kant himself was the first academic to teach regular courses in this area. As is well known, his own approach to anthropology is self-described as ‘pragmatic’, and Kant’s pragmatic anthropology differs markedly from the anthropologies that other early contributors to the new discipline were advocating. In this essay I focus on a fundamental feature of Kant’s anthropology that has been under-appreciated in previous discussions; (...) namely, the particular conception of human nature that he believes anthropology, when pursued properly, leads to. I call this conception a cosmopolitan conception of human nature. In addition to establishing the central importance of this idea for Kant’s project in anthropology, I also try in this essay to unravel some of its ambiguities and tensions as well as to highlight its underlying moral motives. The cosmopolitan conception of human nature that is central to Kant’s anthropology is a further indication of the significance of his anthropology for ethics.Keywords: Immanuel; Kant; Anthropology; Pragmatic; Cosmopolitan; Human nature. (shrink)

Recent years have seen educationalists turning to Emmanuel Levinas when considering the relationship between ethics and education. While it is true that Levinas never speaks of ethics in relation to the practice of classroom education, nonetheless, for Levinas, ethics is a teaching, and learning can only take place in the presence of the Other. This book considers how, within the constraints of the Irish primary school education system, teachers can develop a Levinasian approach to teaching, that affords both them and (...) the children they teach multiple opportunities throughout the school day to take up their ethical responsibility for each other as Other. Beginning from a Levinasian understanding of learning and teaching as constituting primordially relational and ethical events, and weaving the philosophies of Levinas, and the educationalists he inspires, into the approaches of philosophy with children, restorative practice, and PAX, this book suggests a unique approach to ethics in Irish primary school classrooms. The focus of this thesis, then, is on both the philosophical underpinnings that anchor teaching as a Levinasian, and a consideration of what practical approaches could be employed by the Levinasian teacher. (shrink)

As scholarly interest in the experience of French Maoism has been undergoing something of a renaissance, it is unsurprising that the Maoist practice of investigations has elicited varying degrees of attention in recent years. But this attention has tended to be subsumed within, if not overshadowed by, much broader historical and exegetical undertakings. This paper seeks to redress this limitation in the literature by focusing on the lengthiest and most detailed summary of Maoist investigations among peasants in the French countryside,The (...) Book of Poor Peasants, published by Alain Badiou’s Group for the Foundation of the Union of Communists of France Marxist-Leninist in 1976. This book vividly demonstrates the difficulties and limitations associated with the practice of investigations. It thus affords a more critical appreciation of this practice. The book also casts Badiou’s shift toward a ‘politics without party’ in a new light. (shrink)

What is the distinctive trait of the Latin American pattern of modernization? In contrast to western societies, where the debate on modernization has been dominated by the Weberian thematic of bureaucratiz-ation, the most salient feature of the Latin American developmental path is the chronic frailty of legal-constitutional arrangements. In Latin America, the process of modernization and social differentiation has not been followed by the legal stabilization of social complexity but is characterized by a low degree of juridification and institutional precariousness. (...) Drawing on insights from both Luhmann's and Habermas' theories, the article provides a critical theoretical framework for the study of the peculiarities of the Latin American modernizing path. (shrink)

*This article attempts a Marxist critique of Alain Badiou’s positions. The importance of Badiou’s ontology as an affirmation of the possibility of radical-historical novelty is stressed, but also its limits. These limits have to do with Badiou’s abandonment of a dialectical-relational conception of social reality, his refusal of any causal connection between social reality, political decision and event, and the absence of a theory of ideology and hegemony in his work. Consequently, Badiou’s notion of a ‘subtractive’ politics cannot be considered (...) an answer to the open questions of communist strategy, despite his endorsement of the ‘communist hypothesis’. (shrink)

This article analyses the limits of legal norms and institutions in holding to account the emerging power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning. It demonstrates how a symbiosis of capitalism and new forms of digital power is mutating to produce novel and dangerous styles of organised irresponsibility that go beyond the reach of conventional legal mechanisms. It draws on the work of Pashukanis, Baudrillard, and Alain Supiot to show how this transformation is taking place. Referring to the role of (...) AI in the spread of Financial Technologies, it introduces a new term – ‘venture legalism’ – to describe how unprecedented risks are currently being created. It concludes by observing how ethical and democratic registers are equally implausible modes of accountability. (shrink)

This essay seeks to explore the meaning and significance of Angst from the standpoint of hermeneutic phenomenology. Employing a five chapter structure, the essay investigates this phenomenon from two modes of hermeneutic inquiry: what we have called the "macro-" and the "micro-" approaches to hermeneutics. ;Chapter I traces the development of our ground phenomenon, "primordial Angst," from 6000 BCE to the time of Jacob Boehme. In doing so we attempted to uncover four facets of primordial Angst, facets we termed "onto-theological (...) Angst," "strictural Angst," "pneumatical Angst," and finally, "passional Angst." ;Chapter II explores the first in-depth treatment of Angst and the hermeneutic horizons which made Soren Kierkegaard's Begrebnet Angest possible. We discovered that Angst for Kierkegaard must be grasped by an organic and collateral hermeneutic which we termed the "cognitive" as opposed to the "experimental/psychological" approaches. ;Chapter III examines primordial Angst from the perspective of Martin Heidegger's early mature thought. We attempted to again display the hermeneutic horizons of this perspective, showing how Heidegger saw Angst as the condition of the possibility of Dasein's authentic mode of Being as well as the basic attitude of scientific Dasein. ;Chapter IV inquires into Angst from the viewpoint of existential thought. There we looked at Jean Paul Sartre in juxtaposition to Paul Tillich with regard to their markedly different visions of Angst, again attempting to disclose their respective hermeneutic horizons as well as their conclusions. ;Finally, Chapter V returned to the macro-hermeneutic perspective, attempting to summarize, contrast, and compare the micro-hermeneutic of the three preceding chapters. Then we suggested that at the very epicenter of the Angst phenomenon there resides an equally primordial Urwille, or a basic craving for ontological wholeness on the part of Dasein. Thus to bridge the abyss between the finite and the infinite, Dasein created "representational thinking." We argued that only by dwelling in primordial Angst and by abiding in Gelassenheit, the renouncing of representational thought, can Dasein overcome all cognitive distinctions and dwell as one with Being, through what the later Heidegger called "meditative thinking.". (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas is a second-generation social philosopher of the Frankfurt school, the birthplace of critical theory. He suggests that modernity is a project of substituting rationality for religion. In his analysis, such a succession is the result of a process of social evolution, in which each developmental stage has its basic concepts and modes of understanding subjective, objective, and social worlds. For him, the salient feature of rationality consists of differentiation between various validity claims of truth, truthfulness, and sincerity which (...) are indistinguishable in religious language. The rationalization of religion, hence, progresses in terms of a differentiation between validity claims, a decentration of human understanding, the disenchantment of the world, and the linguistification of the sacred. Habermas proposes a universal pragmatics in which two modes of language use are separated: instrumental-strategic, and communicative. He thinks that the failure of the enlightenment movement to replace religion with reason stems from its preoccupation with instrumental reason and language use, dispensing with communicative rationality; and the remedy lies in communicative rationality. (shrink)

This very ambitious and remarkably detailed book examines some of the most fundamental themes in Husserl's philosophy. As is evident from the title, the book has two parts, the first of which (pp. 1-101) discusses Husserl's methodology, esp. the phenomenological reduction, and the second of which (pp. 103-347) investigates the themes of space, time, and other. These themes are selected because they are central to our mundane and embodied experience of an objective, physical and animate world.