There are two main objections against epistemological foundation of logical principles: 1. Every argument for them must necessarily make use of them. 2. Logical principles cannot be abstracted from experience because they imply elements of meaning that exceed in principle our finite experience (like universality & necessity). In opposition to these objections I argue for Husserl's thesis that logic needs a theory of experience as a foundation. To show the practicability of his attempt I argue that he is able to (...) avoid the two circles mentioned. Motivated by this investigation the Appendix presents some mathematical doubts concerning the proofs by Cantor of the transfiniteness of the set of real numbers. (shrink)

A phenomenological approach to mathematical practice is sketched out, and some problems with this sort of approach are considered. The approach outlined takes mathematical practices as its data, and seeks to provide an empirically adequate philosophy of mathematics based on observation of these practices. Some observations are presented, based on two case studies of some research into the classification of C*-algebras. It is suggested that an anti-realist account of mathematics could be developed on the basis of these and other studies, (...) locating the substance of mathematics in the various informal argument methods used by mathematicians. (shrink)