In the 'Hippias Major' Socrates uses a counter-example to oppose Hippias‘s view that parts and wholes always have a "continuous" nature. Socrates argues, for example, that even-numbered groups might be made of parts with the opposite character, i.e. odd. As Gadamer has shown, Socrates often uses such examples as a model for understanding language and definitions: numbers and definitions both draw disparate elements into a sum-whole differing from the parts. In this paper I follow Gadamer‘s suggestion that we should focus (...) on the parallel between numbers and definitions in Platonic thought. However, I offer a different interpretation of the lesson implicit in Socrates‘s opposition to Hippias. I argue that, according to Socrates, parts and sum-wholes may share in essential attributes; yet this unity or continuity is neither necessary, as Hippias suggests, nor is it impossible, as Gadamer implies. In closing, I suggest that this seemingly minor difference in logical interpretation has important implications for how we should understand the structure of human communities in a Platonic context. (shrink)

The primary function of the Platonic dialogue is not the communication of philosophical doctrines but the transformation of the reader's character. This article takes up the question of how, or by what means, the Platonic dialogue accomplishes its transformative goal. An answer is developed as follows. First, the style of reading associated with analytical philosophy is not transformative, on account of its hermeneutical attachment and epistemic equality in the relationship between reader and author. Secondly, the style of reading associated with (...) the genre of commentary is transformative because it is governed by a principle of authority. When the commentary model is applied to the Platonic dialogue, it can be seen that the dialogue mimics the function of the authority principle in transforming the reader into a commentator, that is, someone who reads from a position of detachment and accepts responsibility for himself as moral and epistemic agent. (shrink)

It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals ( sāmānya/jāti ) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. (...) This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika: Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many) Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x) Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only) Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only) Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only) These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy. (shrink)

Recientemente, Gerson y Catana proponen el destierro de la categoría “neoplatonismo” de las historias de la filosofía a partir del análisis de la génesis histórica de su surgimiento como término peyorativo. En este artículo sostengo, por el contrario, que no basta con un mero análisis historiográfico para desactivar la marginalización de los neoplatónicos, sino que es necesario atacar, más que la noción de “neoplatonismo”, la de “originalidad”. Esta noción ha sido importada de modelos externos a los filosóficos y guarda semejanzas (...) importantes con la concepción de originalidad de algunas propuestas de los teóricos de los derechos de autor. (shrink)