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  1. Responding to the Timing Argument.Karl Ekendahl - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):753-771.
    According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I (...)
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  • When is Death Bad, When it is Bad?John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2003-2017.
    On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of subsequentism, according to which the bad thing for the deceased, or the harm of death to the deceased, takes place after he or she has died. The main puzzle for this view is to explain how we can predicate a property at a time (such as having a misfortune or (...)
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  • Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness.Erik Carlson, Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (2):435-444.
    In a recent article in this journal, John Martin Fischer defends the view that death harms its victim after she dies. More specifically, he develops a “truthmaking” account in order to solve what he calls the Problem of Predication for this view. In this reply, we argue that Fischer’s proposed solution to this problem is unsuccessful.
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