Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Early twelfth-century logicians invoked past-tensed statements with future-oriented contents to undermine the assumption that every proposition ‘about the past’ is determinate. In the second half of the century, the notion of future-dependence was used to restrict the scope of necessity per accidens. At some point, this idea began to be applied in theology to solve puzzles surrounding predestination, prescience, prophecy, and faith. In the mid-1160s, Magister Udo quotes some thinkers who insisted that the principle of the necessity of the past (...) should exclude dicta that ‘relate to the future’, such as that he has been predestined. Peter of Poitiers adopted this ‘Ockhamist’ strategy around 1170. We find similar accounts in Simon of Tournai and Alan of Lille, who invoked it in other contexts as well. By the time of Praepositinus of Cremona, Hubert of Pirovano, and Stephen Langton, the restricted principle became something of a common view at Paris. (shrink)

O presente estudo tem o propósito de descrever e analisar um elemento da crítica de Thomas Reid ao ceticismo. Em boa medida, o cerne dessa é a sua crítica à “teoria geral das ideias”. Uma parte menos explorada dessa crítica, e que é o seu pano de fundo, é a concepção reidiana sobre o método de obtenção das verdades filosóficas. Aqui, um item central é a reflexão sobre a adoção de certas “regras do filosofar” de acordo com Reid. A relevância (...) do estudo da concepção do método filosófico, em Reid, pode ser apontada ao lembrar que, em toda a construção de sua teoria sobre as fontes de conhecimento e os princípios do senso comum, as “regras” são rigorosa e universalmente aplicadas. O seu método possibilita entender, ademais, o tipo de rejeição do ceticismo epistemológico que Reid poderá construir. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe article compares Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination. It is argued that though Wollstonecraft was evidently influenced by Rousseau, there are significant differences between their views. These differences are grounded in their different views on the faculty of reason and its relation to the passions. Whereas Rousseau characterizes reason as a derivative faculty, grounded in the more primary faculty of perfectibility, Wollstonecraft perceives reason as the faculty defining human nature. It is argued that contrary to what is often (...) assumed, Wollstonecraft’s conception of the imagination is not primarily characterized by its Romantic features, but rather by the close affinity she posits between reason and the imagination. This close affinity has several consequences. One consequence is that she is less worried than Rousseau about the imagination wandering without external constrains, because she believes in reason’s ability to guide the imagination by choosing its objects. Ultimately the difference between Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination helps us understand why she was a passionate philosopher of the Enlightenment while he was one of its first, perceptive and most articulate critics. (shrink)