Em Uma Teoria da Justiça, John Rawls explicou o intuicionismo como a doutrina que professa o pluralismo irredutível de princípios morais, princípios estes cujos conflitos não poderiam ser resolvidos de maneira principiológica. Segundo Rawls, não se pode oferecer um argumento abstrato que prove que o pluralismo moral é falso. Mas seria possível mostrarmos aquilo que o intuicionista nega existir: o princípio moral mais fundamental, que sistematiza nossas obrigações morais. Este princípio, de acordo com Rawls, seria o princípio da equidade. Neste (...) artigo, eu argumento que Rawls fracassa diante dos intuicionistas. Meus argumentos se valem de uma análise da aplicabilidade do princípio da equidade ao caso das promessas. Primeiro, eu defendo que o princípio da equidade só poderia explicar obrigações morais em geral se ele pudesse conter em sua fórmula um caso paradigmático das obrigações que ele pretende explicar: justamente as obrigações promissórias. Depois, eu procuro mostrar que as mesmas obrigações promissórias contêm um traço essencial que o princípio da equidade não seria capaz de explicar, mesmo que pudesse explicar obrigações morais em geral: o caráter especial das obrigações para com os destinatários das promessas. No primeiro ponto, a minha investigação expande as críticas de Robert Nozick a uma versão do princípio da equidade apresentada por H.L.A. Hart. No segundo, eu desenvolvo objeções feitas por Stephen Darwall contra a teoria prática das promessas, incluindo a teoria de John Rawls. (shrink)

Conventionalism about promising is the view that the power to make binding promises depends essentially on the existence of a social practice or convention of promising. This paper explores an objection to conventionalism that says that—(allegedly) contra conventionalism—there is no morally acceptable world in which we lack the power of promise. Instead, normative powers theorists claim that our power of promise is morally basic or necessary. I argue that the conventionalist need not deny this claim. There are several ways to (...) develop a noncontingent conventionalism: a version of the view that can accommodate the insight that the power of promise is indispensable to morally acceptable lives. Then, I argue that the conventionalist is indeed on the hook for accommodating this insight. I wrap up by considering the state of play in the debate over conventionalism about promising. Once we note the theoretical possibility of noncontingent conventionalism, it looks like the theatre of battle shifts to the difficult question of whether “natural” morality always provides “moral necessities.”. (shrink)

Promises of a customary, interpersonal kind have received no small amount of philosophical attention. Of particular interest has been their capac- ity to generate moral obligations. This capacity is arguably what distinguishes promises from other, similar phenomena, like communicating a firm intention. But this capacity is common to still other nearby phenomena, such as oaths and vows. These latter phenomena belong to the same family of concepts as promises, but they are structurally and functionally distinct. Taken in their turn, they (...) fill out what I call the ‘breadth criterion’: Theories of promising should cover not only customary, interpersonal promises but also sibling phe- nomena, including oaths and vows. Accommodating the breadth criterion is not something all theories of promising are positioned to accomplish. I focus on the challenge that the breadth criterion poses for Scanlon’s influential ex- pectation view of promising and suggest a normative powers account will fare better. (shrink)

The dominant conventionalist view explains the wrong of breaking a promise as failing to do our fair share in supporting the practice of promise-keeping. Yet, this account fails to explain any unique moral standing that a promisee has to demand that the promisor keep the promise. In this paper, I provide a conventionalist response to this problem. In any cooperative practice, participants stand as both beneficiary and contributor. As a beneficiary, they are morally required to follow the rules of the (...) practice. As a contributor, they have claims on other participants to follow the rules. According to the rules of promise-keeping, a promisee has a unique claim on the promisor, and the personal wrong of breaking a promise should be understood as the violation of this unique and practice-dependent claim. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

p.p1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Times} Thomas Scanlon provides a theory of why we ought to keep our promises according to which the wrong of breaking a promise is a moral wrong that does not depend on any social practice. Instead a promise provides a recipient with assurance and the value of assurance establishes a moral obligation to keep our promises. However, it is often charged that theories like Scanlon’s are untenable because they are subject to a (...) vicious circularity. I address some recent critics of Scanlon’s theory, all of whom maintain that his account does not adequately show how a promise provides assurance and therefore does not overcome the charge of circularity in explaining why we are obligated to keep our promises. I revise Scanlon’s theory and show how a promise can provide a recipient with assurance, demonstrating that Scanlon’s account is a tenable theory of why we have an obligation to keep our promises. (shrink)

Este artículo defiende que las obligaciones sociales emergen de las normas de la racionalidad. A través de un análisis de los requisitos normativos de la racionalidad que gobiernan los compromisos individuales, se muestra que los agentes poseen autoridad racional para revaluar sus razones, modificar sus juicios prácticos y cambiar sus intenciones. De esta autoridad depende su autonomía racional: uno y el mismo sujeto puede obligarse a hacer algo, y revocar esta orden. Mediante un compromiso social, el deudor renuncia a su (...) autoridad y autonomía racionales en favor del acreedor, generando así una obligación en el deudor, un derecho en el acreedor, y una razón normativa relativa al deudor. (shrink)

Agents do not merely have duties – they often have directed duties to others. This paper first reveals problems with traditional attempts to equate these directed duties with claims and claim rights. It then defends a novel account of directionality that locates the unifying element of directed duties in a counterparty’s prioritization of the duties owed to her. If one agent has a directed duty to another, then the degree to which fulfilling the duty matters to the agent to whom (...) it is owed itself matters – in a distinctive, special and inherent sense. This subject-determined normative significance of directed duties can be used to articulate a priority account of directionality, an account that can demonstrate why many have taken control powers, interests or the authority to demand compliance to be so important in analyzing the directed duties we owe to others. (shrink)