Although Adam Smith’s thoughts on education have attracted significant scholarly attention, his ideas on how the primary education of children should be funded has been relatively neglected. I re-examine Smith’s nuanced position and argue that Smith had a more flexible view of education funding than has hitherto been recognised. By extending the Scottish educational model, Smith proposed a direct contribution of government to the costs of educating poor children. In addition, his discussion of scholarships indicate that he favoured further indirect (...) subsidies to education. These significant subsidies were designed to ensure that education was accessible and affordable to most people in society, who would only have to contribute a small sum. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that for pupils whose family were unable to support their education, Smith might have favoured a full payment of their fees. Situating Smith’s intervention on education funding within the context of the English and Scottish educational systems reveals a discussion of the role of government in society. The Smithian state that emerges from such a reading actively intervenes where necessary to prevent ‘a publick evil’ (WN V.i.f.60). (shrink)

Historians of political thought have done important and insightful work on women’s history of political thought. This scholarship has proliferated since the mid to late twentieth century and has focused largely on the feminist aspects of their thought. Although this was at first a necessary and crucial correction of prior neglect, I argue that by now this has turned into an overcorrection. By turning to the early reception and rediscovery of two eighteenth-century English female political thinkers, Mary Astell (1666–1731) and (...) Catharine Macaulay (1731–1791), I show that this feminist focus can stand in the way of inclusion by obscuring other important aspects of women’s political thought. I also contend that the feminist focus implies an unfair double standard where women – as opposed to canonical men – are thought of as worthy of inclusion only if they espoused or anticipated ideas that would seem agreeable from a present perspective. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that, if we want to do justice to the feminist aim of comprehensive inclusion of past female thinkers, we must learn to look beyond women’s feminist thought in history and to embrace their afeminist and even anti-feminist thought. (shrink)