One of the challenges of the Kantian research is to deal with the different meanings of the term critique, as well as to ask about the author’s possible motivation in choosing this term to title his main works. Through the emphasis on the fecundity of meaning of the term critique, we will show in this article that its connection with the establishment of limits to metaphysics was a sinuous process, which is capable of encompassing interests of heterogeneous natures. For this (...) purpose, we will first problematize, in particular, the appearance of the concept of critique in NEV of 1765 and, later, based on the Reflections (1765-1770), we will identify how its equivocality, more than an obstacle, favored the construction of its protagonist role in the Kantian corpus. Thus, the critical thinking for Kant, instead of a position facing only the problem of metaphysics, is explained as a position facing the most diverse problems of the modern subject. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Since the seventeenth century, scholars have been accusing each other of ‘dogmatism’. But what exactly did this mean? In exploring this question, this article focuses on philosophy and Biblical scholarship in nineteenth-century Germany. Scholars in both of these fields habitually contrasted Dogmatismus with Kritik, to the point of emplotting the history of their field as a gradual triumph of critical thinking over dogmatic belief. The article shows that charges of dogmatism derived much of their rhetorical force from such progressive (...) narratives. Especially neo-Kantian philosophers and Biblical scholars of liberal Protestant persuasion liked to depict their opponents as clinging to long-superseded modes of thought, thereby implying that these colleagues harked back to a past from which modern Wissenschaft had emancipated itself. This ‘denial of coevalness’, as Johannes Fabian calls it, demonstrates to what extent the vice of dogmatism was imbued with normative visions of how the field or, more broadly, German intellectual life should develop. (shrink)

Intento di questo scritto è considerare la parvenza trascendentale all’interno di una cornice più ampia, ossia in relazione alla parvenza sensoriale, in quanto benché nell’Introduzione alla «Dialettica Trascendentale» Kant faccia solo brevi riferimenti alla parvenza dei sensi, per soffermarsi, invece, sulla parvenza oggetto di critica, mia convinzione è che, in realtà, sia possibile istituire un parallelo tra le due parvenze, perché ritengo che il modo in cui Kant struttura la questione della parvenza trascendentale sia mutuato da quella sensoriale sia rispetto (...) all’utilizzo di alcuni termini che all’uso di una certa metodologia. Il parallelo istituito è indispensabile affinché ci si possa addentrare in un’altra sottile questione sottesa alla parvenza trascendentale: il passaggio che può verificarsi, in certi casi, da ciò che semplicemente illude a ciò che inganna, che è possibile cogliere attraverso l’ampio vocabolario fornito da Kant: Illusion, Blendwerk, Wahn, Täuschung e Betrug. L’ultima parte è dedicata alla comprensione del perché nell’ambito della parvenza trascendentale la critica venga descritta come un metodo catartico. (shrink)