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  1. Has Plantinga “buried” Mackie’s logical argument from evil?Anders Kraal - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (3):189-196.
    In seeking to undermine Mackie’s logical argument from evil, Plantinga assumes that Mackie’s argument regards it as a necessary truth that a wholly good God would eliminate all evil that he could eliminate. I argue that this is an interpretative mistake, and that Mackie is merely assuming that the theist believes that God’s goodness entails that God would eliminate all evil that he could eliminate. Once the difference between these two assumptions, and the implausibility of Plantinga’s assumption, are brought out, (...)
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  • (1 other version)The problem of evil.Michael Tooley - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • A Humean objection to Plantinga’s Quantitative Free Will Defense.Anders Kraal - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):221-233.
    Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity (1974) contains a largely neglected argument for the claim that the proposition “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good” is logically consistent with “the vast amount and variety of evil the universe actually contains” (not to be confused with Plantinga’s famous “Free Will Defense,” which seeks to show that this same proposition is logically consistent with “some evil”). In this paper I explicate this argument, and argue that it assumes that there is more moral good (...)
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  • Natural selection and the problem of evil: An evolutionary model with application to an ancient debate.Robert K. Fleck - 2011 - Zygon 46 (3):561-587.
    Abstract. Since Darwin, scholars have contemplated what our growing understanding of natural selection, combined with the fact that great suffering occurs, allows us to infer about the possibility that a benevolent God created the universe. Building on this long line of thought, I develop a model that illustrates how undesirable characteristics of the world (stylized “evils”) can influence long-run outcomes. More specifically, the model considers an evolutionary process in which each generation faces a risk from a “natural evil” (e.g., predation, (...)
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  • Free will defence with and without molinism.Kenneth J. Perszyk - 1998 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (1):29-64.
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