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  1. Explaining Public Action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):475-485.
    Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and (...)
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  • Indexicality and Action: Why We Need Indexical Beliefs to Motivate Intentional Actions.Juliana Faccio Lima - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):711-731.
    ABSTRACT Are indexical beliefs necessary to explain intentional bodily actions? De se believers argue that we cannot explain intentional bodily actions unless we appeal to indexical beliefs. De se sceptics disagree. Joining the sceptics, Cappelen and Dever have recently advanced a counterexample to de se believers's claim: a case of intentional bodily action that can be explained by their proposed indexical-free Action Inventory Model. In this paper, I argue that the de se sceptics's counterexample ultimately does not work. My argument (...)
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  • Navigation and Indexical Thought.Andreas Stokke - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    This paper argues for a moderate form of essentialism about indexical thought. According to this moderate essentialism, there is a significant category of intentional action that necessarily involves indexical thought. This category of action is navigation, that is, intentionally moving from one location to another by using public information about the world such as a map or a set of directions. It is shown that anti-essentialists face a challenge in accounting for this kind of action without accepting the involvement of (...)
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  • First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
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  • Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves (...)
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