It is widely supposed that methodological naturalism, understood as a thesis about the methodology of science, is metaphysically neutral, and that this in turn guarantees the value-neutrality of science. In this paper we argue that methodological naturalism is underpinned by certain ontological and epistemological assumptions including evidentialism and the causal closure of the physical, adoption of which necessitates commitment to metaphysical naturalism.

It is widely supposed that methodological naturalism, understood as a thesis about the methodology of science, is metaphysically neutral, and that this in turn guarantees the value-neutrality of science. In this paper we argue that methodological naturalism is underpinned by certain ontological and epistemological assumptions including evidentialism and the causal closure of the physical, adoption of which necessitates commitment to metaphysical naturalism.

This article provides a response to John Perry and Sarah Lane Ritchie's article, “Magnets Magic, and Other Anomalies: In Defense of Methodological Naturalism.” In so doing, it provides a defense of some of the arguments I made in my article, “Should a Christian Adopt Methodological Naturalism?” I begin by addressing some of the confusion about my position. However, it is not simply my intention to address confusions. There remain some fundamental differences between my position and Perry and Ritchie's. It is (...) on these differences that I wish to focus––differences that enable me to maintain my critique of methodological naturalism without falling prey to the problems they raise. Constructively, I advance the argument that the Christian scientist should be open to the possibility of theology‐engaged science, as well as the science‐engaged theology that Perry and Ritchie advocate. (shrink)

Several metaphysical naturalists argue that the success of science, together with the claim that scientists adhere to methodological naturalism, amounts to strong evidence for metaphysical naturalism. I call this the scientific-success argument. It is argued that the scientific-success argument is similar to the no-miracles argument for realism in philosophy of science. On the no-miracles argument, the success of science is taken as strong evidence that scientific theories are true. Based on this similarity, some considerations relevant to one argument may also (...) be relevant to the other. One particular consideration is explored. The selectionist response to the no-miracles argument states that on an evolutionary model of science, in which scientific theories are accepted only after surviving a rigorous selection process, the no-miracles argument fails. The selectionist response also applies to the scientific-success argument. If scientific theories are selected for success, we do not need to explain the success of science by appealing to metaphysical naturalism. (shrink)

Recent critiques of methodological naturalism (MN) claim that it fails by conflicting with Christian belief and being insufficiently humble. We defend MN by tracing the real history of the debate, contending that the story as it is usually told is mythic. We show how MN works in practice, including among real scientists. The debate is a red herring. It only appears problematic because of confusion among its opponents about how scientists respond to experimental anomalies. We conclude by introducing our preferred (...) approach, Science‐Engaged Theology. (shrink)

In John Hedley Brooke's response to my 2018 Boyle Lecture he provided some helpful prompts to sharpen my position on naturalism, and posed two further questions to me. This article takes up his prompts, and offers some answers to his questions, especially concerning the Resurrection of Jesus.