In a recent paper, Maslow has suggested that we turn from means-centering to problem-centering in science. In two other papers the present author offered a theoretical foundation which would make Maslow's suggestions psychologically sound. For as he suggests, it is only by centering ourselves towards the task that the task is accomplished or towards the problem that the problem is solved. This does not mean that methods or means, or, in the broader sense, of means as ends or of ends (...) per se, do not constitute problems. The whole problem of psychology is the means by which the organism obtains knowledge; the problem of education is that of means, or the problem of communication is one of means, or of any profession, e.g., engineering or medicine, the problem may be of means as a problem. Whichever is the case it is only so far as problems are solved that we are free to go on to tackle new ones or throw light on the more basic ones and thus enrich our lives. Problem solving, of course, does not mean that particular problems as framed are solvable. For example, if the rules state that one must connect each dot with every other dot on a piece of paper with lines that do not intersect, a four dot problem is solvable but a five dot situation cannot be resolved within these rules. In the latter case it may mean that the problem becomes: “can anyone solve it?” This has been the lesson of the mathematicians and the logical positivists. But what is problem solving? (shrink)

As the twenty-first century begins, Benjamin’s aura as the quality of an authentic-art-object might be outdated, but the notion of kitsch remains essential in a post-Warholian world. The following discussion is an attempt to assess Western contemporaneity. By using a few examples, so to dissect problems into their smallest components, I suggest that the current popularity of kitsch inclinations and behaviours in Western societies are not a means to resist cultural and aesthetic elitism, but an implication of widespread bad taste.

This article is based on the general introduction and the opening sections of chapters 1 and 2 from the author's book,Living in the Labyrinth of Technology. It revisits the process of industrialization as having a dual component: people changing technology and technology changing people. The latter is almost universally overlooked and provides a different perspective.

Over the last ten years, „Theory U″, written by C.O. Scharmer in 2007, has earned broad international recognition. However, critical reviews of its grounding in social sciences and philosophy have been rare. After a brief introduction to Theory U this article examines its methodic approach in the context of its references to the universal history of Toynbee, and epistemological sources in the works of Nietzsche, Capra, Varela, Husserl, and Steiner. The investigation of Theory U’s historical and philosophical grounding comes to (...) the conclusion that it is evidently falling short of adequately capturing real world complexity and does not match widely accepted academic standards. Despite its evident deficiencies, Theory U deserves the merit of uniquely embracing non conventional schools of thought beyond the mainstream literature on leadership theories. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is discuss an application of non-Marxian historical materalism to explanation of non-European societies. Until now this theory has been limited to interpretation of European societies. In order to grasp development of non-European societies (e.gr. Mexico) the extension of typology of societies is proposed which constitutes a new scientific programme based on this theory of historical development.

The five-stage skill-acquisition model developed by Stuart Dreyfus is revisited as an integral part of culture acquisition. This examination sheds light on the role intuitive knowledge plays during the 4th and 5th stages. When modern technology becomes universal and detaches itself from culture, this intuitive knowledge changes. This accounts for the loss of technologies that were socially appropriate and environmentally sustainable.

Evidence evinced primarily from the visual arts suggests that the term `postmodernism' is unlikely to survive as a general description of contemporary culture beyond the year 2000. The concepts of both post-industrialism and postmodernism are examined as presented by six major writers. None makes a convincing case for the establishment of an historical disjunction that separates modernism from postmodernism either during the 1960s or at any other time. There is a need to recognize that the modernism of the late 19th (...) and early 20th century is no longer modern. It would be better described as the formalesque. This will make it possible to recognize the `postmodern' as the true modernism of the 20th century, the prime sources of which lie in Dada, surrealism and the Neue Sachlichkeit. (shrink)

Taking a managerial perspective, this article presents some models of history with a view to draw lessons for leadership and management of organizations and institutions. The suggested models include: evolution of human thought in terms of religions, science and spirituality and their convergence; transitions in society from kingdom–state to nation–state to corporates as state and beyond; creativity view of history; dignity struggle and liberation view of history; ‘fall of the fittest’ view of history; and the swastika analysis of history. The (...) article explores the implications of these models for providing enlightened leadership to organizations and society by creating synergy between influences from the West and the East. (shrink)

This article explores the impact of the new communications technologies on the generation born in the 1980s, the first to grow up under the dominance of the computer. It considers some of the parameters for discussing the close of one era and the beginning of another and draws on the writings of major civilizationist historians and futurologists, including Jacques Ellul, Samuel Huntington, and Romano Guardini.

In a systematic investigation of national art histories, Bernard Smith’s Place, Taste and Tradition: A Study of Australian Art since 1788, first published in 1945, would likely emerge as an Ur-text of the genre. The book’s rewriting of Australian art history within a Marxist tradition of ‘culturalist’ criticism was a major advance on the available models. Its success stems in no small part from its judicious and balanced account of how social forces intersect. The book privileges economic production as a (...) primary force, as does any Marxian text deserving of the name, but no more than it privileges cultural production and reception as primary forces. (shrink)

Multiculturalism is, among other things, an attitude toward values - hence, an ethic of a kind. The question it poses, however, is what kind of ethics are possible when it is assumed that the one world culture that stood behind classical social ethics no longer pertains. The issue binds most strictly when it is further assumed that social ethics entail political commitments to change the worlds. Hence, the practical consideration of whether or not plural worlds of incommensurable values allow for (...) ethical strategies sufficient to change for the better - where ‘better’ is itself open to doubt. (shrink)

The great revolutions of modern times have been analysed from various angles, but their civilizational aspects and contexts have on the whole been neglected. More specifically, the major 20th-century revolutions can be seen as particularly important cases of intercivilizational encounters. They represent different responses to the ascendant and challenging civilization of the West. The Western civilizational trajectory (or set of trajectories), based on a shift from fideism to empiricism and on multiple social dynamics fuelled by this cultural reorientation (such as (...) those of the capittalist economy and the one-nation-state), is selectively appropriated by non-Western societies which at the same time reject the less adaptable parts of the West in the name of traditional or invented alternatives. Russia, China, Turkey and Iran are analysed as variations of this recurrent pattern. At one end of the spectrum, the Russian revolution aspired to transcend Western models on the basis of a more radical interpretation of their own principles; at the other, the Iranian revolution, made up of several episodes with intervals in between, has been characterized by an exceptionally tenacious - and in some ways inventive - defence of a pre-existing civilizational identity. (shrink)

Established religions integrate a society's everyday secular realities with humankind's numinous experience of the holy. Powerful emotions nourish the cultural expression of the archetypes propelling the “ritual dances” of art, sport, and technocracy. During sacred moments such as mother‐infant or adult bonding, neuroendocrine triggers activate lifelong ties. The cultural canon of the left cortex contrasts with the intuitive right. Brainstem “switches” alternate the left's cool, extraverted, sympathetic drive for control with the right's “warm” attachment behavior and dreaming sleep. Psychic trauma (...) damages flexibility with resultant alexithymic blindness to emotions and archetypes. Substance abuse and narcissistic overemphasis on control ensue. (shrink)

What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? At least three philosophical issues merit attention: (a) The requirements of multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity while securing such equality (...) and inculcating commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among political equals living in a Union as compared to a unitary state. The article responds on the basis of several arguments in favour of certain kinds of equality. All Union citizens must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain ‘citizenship norms’. This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union. I also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. The paper concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship. (shrink)

The author has attempted to explore historical evidence to seek insights into differences in temperament and ethos between the Eastern and the Western leadership styles. In the process a comparative study of eight personalities (five each from the East and West), comprising nation builders, businessmen, entrepreneurs and politicians, has been done. These leaders have been selected in terms of their social milieu, standing the test of time, having given a sense of direction to their organizations and their leadership qualities, instead (...) of just skills. It has been observed that the Eastern leaders have a spiritual underpinning with varying intensity. On the contrary, leaders from the West in comparable fields do not appear to show any inclination towards reconciliation of spiritual values with material goals. This also vindicates the hypothesis that the Eastern ethos is dominantly 'feminine-intuitive' whereas the Western ethos is primarily 'masculine-rational'. (shrink)

The dynamics of ancient civilisations according to credited historians can be explained by means of a simple linear time-invariant feedback model whose loop only consists of a first-order process and a pure time delay. It is shown that, despite its simplicity, this model can give rise to a variety of responses, either oscillatory or aperiodic, such as those envisaged by A. Toynbee. Since modern civilisations are characterised by fast parameter variations, their description calls instead for a time-variant model. Simulations with (...) the linear parameter-varying model obtained from the aforementioned LTI model by letting its parameter vary are carried out to show the influence of different scenarios on the system response. Even if this model is elementary, it is believed that it may serve as a stimulating “tool for thought” in the ever-popular debate on the growth and decline of civilisations. (shrink)

The levels that compose biological hierarchies each have their own energetic, spatial and temporal structure. Indeed, it is the discontinuity in energy relationships between levels, as well as the similarity of sub-systems that support them, that permits levels to be defined. In this paper, the temporal structure of living hierarchies, in particular that pertaining to Human society, is examined. Consideration is given to the period defining the lifespan of entities at each level and to a periodic event considered fundamental to (...) the maintenance of that level. The ratio between the duration of these two periods is found to be approximately 2.5 × 104. A similar relationship is found when lower, non-living levels of molecules and atoms are considered. This suggests that there is a constant factor of amplification between analogous periodic events at successive levels of the Human hierarchy. (shrink)

The attempts to interpret Russian and Southeast European history in light of a Byzantine background tend to focus on traditions of political culture, and to claim that patterns characteristic of the late Roman Empire have had a formative impact on later developments. But the effects attributed to political culture presuppose a civilizational framework, and arguments on that level must come to grips with evidence of historical discontinuity, during the Byzantine millennium as well as in later centuries and on the periphery (...) of the Byzantium cultural world. The path to a historically grounded civilizational analysis is, however, obstructed by persisting images of Byzantium as a stagnant culture, immobilized by a complete fusion of secular and sacred authority. The article discusses and criticizes some of the most influential versions of this view. (shrink)

The Chinese view of time and history cannot be defined as either “cyclicality” or “linearity” in the sense of St. Augustine and Hegel. Like the Indo-Hellenic cyclicality, it regards the cyclical movements as universal in both Heaven and human. Nevertheless, it contains neither the conception of Great Year or Mahayuga, nor that of repeated destruction and reconstruction of humankind. It holds that the cyclical movements do not recur as “uniform rotation,” but appear as a chain composed of countless links each (...) of which possesses individuality. It is not the chain itself, but each of its links that cyclically develop. Meanwhile, it agrees with the Judeo-Christian tradition that there is no repetition and reversibility for historical figures and events. However, it does not believe that history has an absolute beginning and end, demonstrating itself as a One-Grand Cycle from human alienation from God to their reconciliation with Him. (shrink)