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  1. Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
    Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.
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  • An Inconsistent Triad: Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and (the Possibility of) Gunky Time.Jamie Taylor - 2020 - Theoria 86 (2):268-285.
    Priority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunk – where some interval of time is gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subinterval – is at least metaphysically possible, are three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given that – as I will argue – pluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to accommodate temporal gunk if they (...)
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  • Harmoniously Investigating Concrete Structures.Nikk Effingham - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):190-195.
    Traynor identifies a tension between armchair reasoning telling us about the mereological structure of objects and empirical investigation telling us about the structure of spacetime. Section 1 explains, and bolsters, that tension. Section 2 discusses Traynor's resolution, and suggests some possible problems with it, whilst Section 3 discusses an alternative.
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