Traditionally, special divine acts have been understood as involving intervention in the course of nature, so as to cause events that nature would not, or could not, otherwise produce. The concept of divine intervention has come under heavy fire in recent times, however. This has caused many philosophers and theologians either to abandon the possibility of special divine acts or to attempt to show how such acts need not be understood as interventions in natural processes. This paper argues that three (...) objections typically raised against special divine acts conceived as interventions in the natural order are pseudo-problems and pose no reason to abandon the traditional conception of such acts. Further, it argues that attempted noninterventionist accounts constitute a blind alley of investigation, inasmuch as they fail to provide a secure foundation for a robust account of the possibility of special divine acts. (shrink)

Działanie Boga a prawa przyrody: odpowiedź Łukasiewiczowi W odpowiedzi Łukasiewiczowi na Opatrzność Boża a przypadek w świecie bronię trzech wniosków. Po pierwsze, stanowisko nazwane przez niego „deizmem epistemicznym” staje przed wyzwaniami ze strony fizyki, których często się nie zauważa. Po drugie, jeśli teiści opowiadający się za argumentem celowościowym opartym na tzw. delikatnym dostrojeniu nie mają racji, to nie ma jej również większość fizyków, która uważa, że delikatne dostrojenie wymaga wyjaśnienia. Po trzecie, nie wszystkie prawa przyrody są warunkowe w takim sensie, (...) jaki przyjmuje Łukasiewicz. Na szczęście rozróżnienie między prawami a nienomologiczną informacją pozwala na rozszerzenie jego modelu działania Boga. (shrink)

In 2013 I wrote a paper entitled “A Deistic Discussion of Murphy and Tracy’s Accounts of God’s Limited Activity in the Natural World,” in which I criticized the views of Nancey Murphy and Thomas Tracy, labeling their views as something that I called “epistemic deism.” Since the publication of that paper another, similar, view by Bradley Monton was brought to my attention, one called “noninterventionist special divine action theory.” I take this paper as an opportunity to accomplish several goals. First, (...) I take it as an opportunity to clarify and correct some of my previous claims. Secondly, I present and analyze Monton’s view. And, finally, I discuss the similarities that Monton’s view holds with those of Murphy’s and Tracy’s and discuss how they all can be reduced to being part of the same family of ontological views which are, ultimately, implausible. (shrink)

I start by way of clarifying briefly the problem of special divine intervention. Once this is done, I argue that laws of nature are generalizations that derive from the dispositional behaviour of natural kinds. Based on this conception of laws of nature I provide a metaphysical model according to which God can realize acts of special divine providence by way of temporarily changing the dispositions of natural entities. I show that this model does not contradict scientific practice and is consistent (...) with the assumption that the physical realm is causally closed. I then argue that prima facie any putative candidate for an act of God could also be seen as a random event or as indicating that there is something wrong with our formulation of the corresponding law of nature. While there is no sufficient philosophical or scientific reason to prefer one of these models, I argue that there are sufficient and legitimate theological reasons to endorse a framework in which at least the obtaining of some anomic states of affairs is seen as the effect of special divine intervention. Doing so, theology has the hermeneutic resources to uncover a dimension of meaningful reality, which without faith could not be seen. (shrink)

یکی از نظریات بسیار مهم و چالش‌برانگیز خداباوری گشوده، دیدگاه خاص آن درباره صفت علم مطلق الهی است. خداباوری گشوده اذعان دارد که خدا عالم مطلق است، اما با این قید که علم خدا به افعال اختیاری که انسان در آینده انجام می‌دهد تعلق نمی‌گیرد. پذیرش اختیار مطلق برای انسان توسط خداباوران گشوده و پذیرش تعارض میان «افعال اختیاری انسان در آینده» با «علم پیشینی خداوند» سبب شده است که آنها علم پیشینی خدا به این افعال را انکار کنند. در (...) عین حال، از نظر آنان عدم علم پیشینی خداوند به این نوع افعال، خدشه‌ای به علم مطلق او وارد نمی‌کند. خداباوران گشوده با ذکر انواع دیدگاه‌ها درباره علم خدا و بیان اشکالاتی که در این نظریات وجود دارد، دیدگاه خاص خودشان را اثبات می‌کنند و این دیدگاه را هم به لحاظ منطقی-فلسفی سازوارتر و هم به لحاظ مبتنی بودن بر کتاب مقدس سازگارتر می‌دانند. آنها، در یک تقسیم رایج و کلی، سه دیدگاه را قسیم دیدگاه خودشان می‌دانند که عبارت‌اند از «علم بسیط یا صرف»، «علم میانی» و «دیدگاه آگوستینی-کالونی». مدافعان خداباوری گشوده بعد از بیان اشکالات وارد بر هر کدام از این نظریات، که غالباً بر محدود شدن اختیار انسان، یا تعارض با کتاب مقدس تکیه دارند، نظریه خاص خودشان را تثبیت می‌کنند. (shrink)

The Abrahamic traditions regard God as the world’s author. But what kind of author? A novelist? A playwright? Perhaps a composer of classical music? I will argue that it is best to regard God as like an improvisational play director or the leader of a jazz ensemble. Each determines the broad melodic contours or coarse-grained plot beforehand, while allowing their musicians or actors, and chance, to fill in the more fine-grained details. This analogy allows us to regard God as the (...) ultimate author of this world, while allowing us to be, while less than co-authors, more than mere enactors of a pre-written piece. These metaphors are particularly well-suited to illustrate and flesh out an Open Theistic view of things. (shrink)

I argue that if one accepts the existence of a multiverse model that posits the existence of all possible realities, and also wants to maintain the existence of a God who exemplifies omnipotence, omnibenevolence and omniscience then the brand of God that he should ascribe to is one of deism rather than the God of classical theism. Given the nature and construct of such a multiverse, as well as some specific interpretations of the divine attributes, this points us to a (...) God who is inactive in the natural world, not one who is. This deistic conception of God not only sits better with the idea of a multiverse and is also compatible with many arguments for theism, but it also responds to certain arguments for atheism better than the classical conception of God. I ultimately argue that deism ought to be given consideration as a plausible alternative conception to the classical conception of God, given the acceptance of a multiverse. (shrink)