In this article I respond to the eight critical essays in this issue that evaluate the claims in my book with Gerhard Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency.

In this article I respond to the eight critical essays in this issue that evaluate the claims in my book with Gerhard Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency.

Obgleich die Ausdrücke ‚moralische Pflicht’ und ‚moralische Verantwortung’ auf den ersten Blick nahezu austauschbar scheinen, ist in einigen Debatten dennoch fast ausschließlich von moralischer Verantwortung die Rede. Dies gilt insbesondere für die moralische Beurteilung von individuellen Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten. Hier scheint die Rede von einer ‚kollektiven Verantwortung‘ besonders attraktiv zu sein. In diesem Aufsatz setze ich mich diesem Trend entgegen und argumentiere dafür, dem Pflichtbegriff in kollektiven Kontexten gegenüber dem Begriff der Verantwortung den Vorrang zu geben. Mein Fokus liegt (...) hierbei auf einer bestimmten Art von Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten, nämlich auf Handlungen in sogenannten Aggregatkollektiven. Von Aggregatkollektiven verursachte Schäden sind häufig kumulative Schäden, bei denen die Handlungen der Mitglieder eines Aggregatkollektivs einzeln betrachtet keinen merklichen Unterschied für das Auftreten des Schadens machen. Die Rede von Verantwortung legt ein Haftbarkeitsmodell moralischer Verantwortung nahe, welches sich in Bezug auf Handlungen in Aggregatkollektiven als problematisch erweist. Ich zeige, dass Kants Konzeption unvollkommener Pflichten eine vielversprechende Alternative zu dem kausal gefärbten Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung darstellt. Durch den Spielraum, den unvollkommene Pflichten Akteuren lassen, bieten sie eine ähnliche Offenheit wie der Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung. Anders als die Zuschreibung von Verantwortung vermeidet die Rede von unvollkommenen Pflichten jedoch die in kollektiven Kontexten oft inadäquate und kontraproduktive Assoziation von Haftung und Schuld. (shrink)

According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the doctrine such as James’ Rachels’ Wicked Uncle Case and Jonathan (...) Bennett’s argument that any acceptable analysis of the distinction leaves it implausible that the distinction is morally relevant. I consider putative defences of the Doctrine from Philippa Foot and Warren Quinn. I argue that neither Foot not Quinn provides a satisfactory justification of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, but that the idea of self-ownership discussed by Quinn can be developed to provide a justification of the doctrine. (shrink)

According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent attempts to analyse this distinction:. Philippa Foot’s sequence account, Warren (...) Quinn’s action/ inaction account, and counterfactual test accounts put forward by Shelly Kagan and Jonathan Bennett. I also discuss Jeff McMahan’s account of the removal of barriers to harm. I argue that analysis of the distinction has often been made more difficult by two mistaken assumption: (1) the assumption that when an agent does or allows harm his behaviour makes the difference to whether or not the harm occurs (2) the assumption that the distinction between doing and allowing and the distinction between action and inaction are interchangeable. I suggest that Foot’s account is the most promising account of the doing/allowing distinction, but that it requires further development. (shrink)

The intentional punishment of the innocent is ordinarily claimed to be a special problem for utilitarian theories of punishment. The unintentional punishment of the innocent is a problem for any theory of punishment which holds that the guilty should be punished. This paper examines the criteria that are relevant to a determination of the appropriate probability of punishment mistakes for a society, and argues that this is the kind of moral problem for which utilitarian judgments, as opposed to considerations of (...) justice, are most appropriate. To illustrate some of the trade-offs involved, the paper employs some hypothetical data. (shrink)

We can enjoy and suffer many kinds of human goods and evils. The goods include not only experiences and enjoyments but also the having and exercise of various talents and abilities, the receipt of recognitions and rewards, successes, employments, opportunities. The evils include not only pains and frustrations but also defects such as ugliness, disabilities such as paralysis or retardation, lack of standard opportunities such as unemployment, financial loss, failure, disgrace. It is tempting to say that wherever a person has (...) a good he has an advantage and when he suffers an evil he is, in that respect, disadvantaged. However this usage can make it look as if all human goods and evils are subject matter for distributive justice. In fact that is not the conventional view. (shrink)

Many people believe the morality of abortion stands or falls on the moral status of the fetus, with abortion opponents arguing fetuses are persons with a right to life. Judith Jarvis Thomson bypasses this debate, arguing that even if we assume fetuses have a right to life, this is not a right to use other people’s bodies. Recently Perry Hendricks attempts to bypass discussion of rights, assuming that if he can show that some people have a right to use other’s (...) bodies, then we ought to restrict abortion (and perhaps compel organ donation, charity, etc.). Hendricks attempts to illustrate this by way of a Feinberg-style cabin case. I argue Hendricks’ restrictivist argument fails. (shrink)

The difficulty in discovering a difference between killing and letting die has led many philosophers to deny the distinction. This paper seeks to develop an argument defending the distinction between killing and letting die. In relation to Rachels’ cases, the argument is that (a) even accepting that Smith and Jones may select equally heinous options from the choices they have available to them, (b) the fact that the choices available to them are different is morally relevant, and (c) this difference (...) in available choices can be used to distinguish between the agents in certain circumstances. It is the principle of justice, as espoused by Aristotle, which requires that equal things are treated equally and that unequal things are treated unequally that creates a presumption that Smith and Jones should be treated differently. The magnitude of this difference can be amplified by other premises, making the distinction morally relevant in practical reality. (shrink)

What makes killing morally wrong? And what makes killing morally worse than letting die? Standard answers to these two questions presuppose that killing someone involves shortening that person's life. Yet, as I argue in the first two sections of this article, this presupposition is false: Life-prolonging killings are conceivable. In the last two sections of the article, I explore the significance of the conceivability of such killings for various discussions of the two questions just mentioned. In particular, I show why (...) the conceivability of life-prolonging killings renders Frances M. Kamm's attempt to provide an answer to the second question problematic. (shrink)

Although we do not know exactly how many people die each year of malnutrition or related health problems, the number is very high, in the millions. By giving money to support famine relief efforts, each of us could save at least some of them. By not giving, we let them die.

Moral patients deserve moral consideration and concern – they have moral standing. What factors drive attributions of moral standing? Understanding these factors is important because it indicates how broadly individuals conceptualize the moral world, and suggests how they will treat various entities, both human and non-human. This understanding has recently been advanced by a series of studies conducted by both psychologists and philosophers, which have revealed three main drivers of moral standing: the capacity to suffer, intelligence or autonomy, and the (...) nature of an entity's disposition. These studies have also revealed causal links between moral standing and other variables of interest, namely, mental state attributions and moral behavior. In this review, I consider this recent research, aiming to clarify what the balance of evidence indicates about how moral standing is judged and about its links to mind perception and behavior. I conclude by suggesting open questions for future research on this exciting topic. (shrink)

In contemplating any life and death moral dilemma, one is often struck by the possible importance of two distinctions; the distinction between killing and “letting die”, and the distinction between an intentional killing and an action aimed at some other outcome that causes death as a foreseen but unintended “side-effect”. Many feel intuitively that these distinctions are morally significant, but attempts to explain why this might be so have been unconvincing. In this paper, I explore the problem from an explicitly (...) consequentialist point of view. I first review and endorse the arguments that the distinctions cannot be drawn with perfect clarity, and that they do not have the kind of fundamental significance required to defend an absolute prohibition on killing. I go on to argue that the distinctions are nonetheless important. A complete consequentialist account of morality must include a consideration of our need and ability to construct and follow rules; our instincts about these rules; and the consequences that might follow if the agent breaks a good general rule, particularly if this involves acting contrary to moral instinct. With this perspective, I suggest that the distinctions between killing and letting die and between intending and foreseeing do have moral relevance, especially for those involved in the care of the sick and dying. (shrink)

The researcher believes that James Rachels’s defense of active euthanasia deserves a critical and normative analysis because of its dehumanizing consequences. The researcher demonstrates that Rachels’s position is conceptually, theoretically, practically, and normatively unjustifiable. The researcher supports his position by three steps.

The Principle of Double Effect has served as a guide for both statesmen and soldiers since the middle ages in determining which acts in war are morally permissible and which are not. It is used, in particular, by those who make their moral decisions on the basis of certain moral rules that concern the moral consequences of action. This Principle of Double Effect (hereafter referred to as PDE) comes into play in situations where an agent has the option of performing (...) an act with both good and bad consequences. Advocates of PDE believe that it is morally significant whether a bad consequence is intended by the agent or merely forseen as incidental to an act that is in all other respects morally acceptable.^ Of great interest to moral philosophers discussing acts of war is how this principle applies to the deaths of persons not directly involved in the prosecution of the war. Proponents of the PDE claim that while it is morally impermissible to intentionally bring about the deaths of innocent people during combat, either as a means to a military objective or as a goal in itself, it is permissible under certain circumstances for an agent to choose a course of action which may bring about the deaths of innocent people as a forseeable consequence. (shrink)

Counterfactuals about what a patient would consent to, if he were able to consent, are often cited as justifications, or partial justifications, for acts of euthanasia. In virtue of this fact, they deserve special scrutiny by moral philosophers. ;In Chapter I, I examine terminology that is essential to further understanding the relationship between euthanasia and counterfactual consent. I propose a definition of 'euthanasia', an analysis of 'consent', and I present a brief description of counterfactuals. ;In Chapter II, I consider two (...) questions. The first is, "When it is appropriate to invoke counterfactual consent in an attempt to justify an act of euthanasia?" By making use of an improved version of the voluntary, nonvoluntary, and involuntary distinction among acts of euthanasia, I am able to determine when it is appropriate to cite counterfactuals about consent in an attempt to justify an act of euthanasia. The second is, "to what end is counterfactual consent used?" I contend that counterfactual consent does morally justify some acts of euthanasia, and defend an argument for this claim. Finally, I look at the role of counterfactual consent as a possible legal justification for acts of euthanasia. ;In Chapter III, I use possible world semantics to analyze counterfactual consent. Traditional counterfactuals are determined to be true if in the closest world at which their antecedent is true, their consequent is also true. Counterfactuals about consent have a less straightforward reading. I consider and reject several possible ways of reading counterfactuals about consent, before settling on the correct reading of counterfactuals about consent. ;In Chapter IV, I consider evidence for the truth of claims about counterfactual consent. I consider and reject the claim that no counterfactual is either true or false. I examine both Living Wills and the practice of surrogacy, neither of which offers sufficient evidence for the truth of claims about counterfactual consent. ;In Chapter V, I contrast counterfactual consent with actual consent. I review and refute the arguments for the claim that actual consent is preferable to counterfactual consent. I conclude by presenting a principle about the relationship between actual and counterfactual consent. (shrink)

The moral significance of the distinction between killing and allowing to die has played a key role in debates about euthanasia and physician assisted suicide. Since the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is held as morally permissible in the medical community, it follows that if there is no morally significant difference between killing and allowing to die, then there is no morally significant difference between withdrawing life-sustaining treatment or administering a lethal injection to end a patient’s life. Consistency then requires that (...) voluntary active euthanasia is also morally permissible. The debates over whether the distinction is morally significant have carried on for decades with little hope of consensus. We begin by surveying the literature to identify common argumentative strategies used in defending or rejecting the distinction’s significance. We observe, based on our review, that many of these strategies operate in ways that are conceptually removed from the concrete clinical situation of physicians involved in practices that lead to patient death. We conclude by arguing for a novel way of moving the debate forward indicated by our reading of the literature, namely, by paying careful attention to the moral experience of physicians involved in end-of-life interventions to understand how they experience these practices. Exploring physician experience can reveal how the distinction may or may not be useful for moral deliberation and can provide the needed context to theorize about the distinction in a more empirically informed and practically useful way. (shrink)

Conservative and liberal approaches to the problem of abortion are oversimplified and deeply flawed. Accepting that the moral status of the conceptus changes during gestation, the author advances a more nuanced perspective. Through applying a form of rules in practice utilitarianism within the context of overall population policy, he provides a compelling ethical and legal framework for regulating contraception and abortion practices.

Is it worse to kill someone than to let someone die? It seems obvious to common sense that it is worse. We allow people to die, for example, when we fail to contribute money to famine-relief efforts; but even if we feel somewhat guilty, we do not consider ourselves murderers. Nor do we feel like accessories to murder when we fail to give blood, sign an organ-donor card, or do any of the other things that could save lives. Common sense (...) tells us that, while we may not kill people, our duty to give them aid is much more limited. Some philosophers, however, have argued that common sense is wrong about this. They have defended the Equivalence Thesis, which says that killing and letting die are equally bad. This is a more specific version of the idea that there is no moral difference between making something happen and allowing it to happen. The Equivalence Thesis is a radical conception that would require changes in our ordinary moral beliefs. If it is true, then obviously our duty to give aid is much stronger than we commonly assume. But our views about other matters, such as euthanasia, will also be affected. Many people believe that “passive euthanasia”--allowing terminal patients to die, rather than pointlessly prolonging their lives--is sometimes permissible; but they also believe that killing patients is always wrong. If the Equivalence Thesis is true, this combination of beliefs is inconsistent. The idea behind the Equivalence Thesis is not that every individual case of letting die is equally as bad as every individual case of killing. Obviously, if we compare an ordinary murder--say, a man killing his wife out of jealousy--with the actions of a physician who humanely permits a suffering patient to die, the murder is much worse. Rather, the idea is that the difference between killing and letting die does not itself make a difference to the moral assessment of the actions. Other factors may still be important. (shrink)