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Fact-insensitive thought experiments in climate ethics – Exemplified by Parfit’s non-identity problem

In Tahseen Jafry (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice. Routledge. pp. 42-56 (2018)

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The non-identity problem in climate ethics: A restatement.Jasmina Nedevska - 2020 - Intergenerational Justice Review 5 (2).details This article justifies and restates the non-identity problem in relation to climate change. First and briefly, I argue that while there is often good reason to set the NIP aside in practical politics, there can be areas where a climate NIP will have practical implications. An instructive example concerns climate change litigation. Second, I argue that there are three particular circumstances of a climate NIP that may set it apart from the more established NIP in bioethics. These differences regard interaction, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Fact-insensitive thought experiments in climate ethics – Exemplified by Parfit’s non-identity problem.Jörg Tremmel - 2018 - In Tahseen Jafry (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice. Routledge. pp. 42-56.details Abstract More than some other fields of ethics, climate ethics is related to pressing real-world problems. Climate ethicists have a responsibility to be precise about the status of the problems they discuss. The non-identity problem (NIP) plays are a prominent role in the climate ethics literature. In a widely discussed statement, Derek Parfit claimed that a risky climate policy is not harmful for (distant) future people. But this ignores the “insignificant-causal-factors rejoinder”. The Parfitian assertion is still treated as serious problem (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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