A rational interpretation is proposed for two ancient Indian logics: the Jaina saptabhaṅgī, and the Mādhyamika catuṣkoṭi. It is argued that the irrationality currently imputed to these logics relies upon some philosophical preconceptions inherited from Aristotelian metaphysics. This misunderstanding can be corrected in two steps: by recalling their assumptions about truth; by reconstructing their ensuing theory of judgment within a common conceptual framework.

Jain ādhyātmik (spiritual, mystical) poets from the 17th to 19th centuries (e.g., Banārasīdās, Ānandghan, Cidānanda) elaborated a category of ineffability to discuss the pure experience of the soul or self (ātma-anubhava). These early-modern Jain poets mobilized a very specific understanding of the ineffable, one that resists language and logocentrism as sources of delusion and conflict. The focus on the ineffable in this poetry is always attended by a set of terms that qualify the ādhyātmik view. These are a privileging of (...) the neutral (samatā), experience (anubhava), and on the other hand, a demotion of opinion, partisanship, doctrinarism, and bigotry (matawālā, mata-arthi, mata-jaṅgī). This paper will show that a shared constellation of terms, intertextuality, and a rejection of partisanship and logocentrism bound a group of Jain poets from the 17th to 19th centuries to a particular endorsement and understanding of ineffability; one which was authorized and emboldened by an engagement with Jain philosophical plurality and non-absolutism. The poetry exhibits a frequent co-occurrence of ādhyātmik anubhava with the Jain the epistemological system known as saptabhaṅgī (Jain seven-valued predications), of which avaktavya (sometimes translated as ineffable or non-assertable) is a prominent aspect. The association philosophically grounds ādhyātmik positions and reinforces their assertion that some aspects of reality, namely ātma-anubhava, are ineffable and beyond the realm of phenomenal predication. (shrink)