This article argues that the imaginary and the experienced body cannot fully be understood without an appreciation of the specific historical context in which they are formed. Offering a case study of military masculinity in Britain in the Second World War, the article examines the significance of the medical examination and subsequent physical classification of potential recruits to the Armed Forces in constructions of the male body. Individual responses, drawn from oral testimonies, are examined to explore the relationship between the (...) discursive and experienced body. These suggest the power of the social body in defining the meaning of the individual body. Nonetheless, despite the dominance of physical classification in the definition of hegemonic masculinity, individual experiences reveal that the concept and meaning of physical grading could be negotiated in ways which introduced less stable and more multiple meanings of the individual body and its relationship to the national body. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers of biology bring the tools of feminist theory, and in particular the tools of feminist philosophy of science, to investigations of the life sciences. While the critical examination of the categories of sex and gender (which will be explained below) takes a central place, the methods, ontological assumptions, and foundational concepts of biology more generally have also enjoyed considerable feminist scrutiny. Through such investigations, feminist philosophers of biology reveal the extent to which the theory and practice of particular (...) scientific disciplines and research programs (and, indeed, their philosophical study) are intertwined with both value judgments and social hierarchies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, I address a highly controversial question of feminist philosophy, namely, the so-called sex/gender distinction, from a Deweyan perspective. I argue that Dewey's naturalism provides useful insights for dealing with and solving the problems concerning this particular type of dualism. My argumentation unfolds in three steps. First, after having briefly introduced the meanings of the two terms, I outline two different, both unsuccessful strategies for overcoming the sex/gender distinction, namely, what I call the radical social constructionist and (...) the nondialectical naturalist strategies. Second, I draw on Dewey's version of naturalism with the aim of conceiving of human beings as simultaneously naturally and socially constructed. Third, I sketch out the hypothesis that Dewey's way of overcoming the pernicious dichotomy between nature and society may be useful for outlining a critical metaphysics of gender. (shrink)