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  1. Withhold by Default: A Difference Between Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    It may seem that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons differently, because ties in practical rationality tend to generate permissions and ties in epistemic rationality tend to generate a requirement to withhold judgment. I argue that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons in the same way, but they have different "default biases". Practical rationality is biased toward every option being permissible whereas epistemic rationality is biased toward withholding judgment's being required.
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  • The normative significance of God’s self.Troy Seagraves - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (2).
    This paper argues that God plausibly has facts of self that function as modifiers of the normative reasons that apply to him. Facts of self are subjective facts like the fact that one has certain commitments, the fact that one has a certain character, the fact that one has a certain practical identity, the fact that one has certain projects. There is a widespread intuition (the normative significance of self) that facts of self influence what an agent’s sufficient reasons are. (...)
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