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  1. Experimental epistemology and "Gettier" cases.John Turri - 2018 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-217.
    This chapter reviews some faults of the theoretical literature and findings from the experimental literature on “Gettier” cases. Some “Gettier” cases are so poorly constructed that they are unsuitable for serious study. Some longstanding assumptions about how people tend to judge “Gettier” cases are false. Some “Gettier” cases are judged similarly to paradigmatic ignorance, whereas others are judged similarly to paradigmatic knowledge, rendering it a theoretically useless category. Experimental procedures can affect how people judge “Gettier” cases. Some important central tendencies (...)
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  • Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: a Nyāya-Informed Account of Perceptual Disjunctivism.Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2020 - Sophia 60 (4):917-940.
    Perceptual disjunctivism is a controversial thesis about perception. One familiar characterization of the thesis maintains that there is no common epistemic kind that is present in both veridical and non-veridical cases of perception. For example, the good case, in which one sees a yellow lemon, and the bad case, in which one hallucinates a yellow lemon, share a specific first-person phenomenology, being indistinguishable from the first-person point of view; however, seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon do not, (...)
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  • Knowledge and belief in Korean.John Turri & YeounJun Park - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (5):742-756.
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  • Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1495-1501.
    Reliabilism says that knowledge must be produced by reliable abilities. Abilism disagrees and allows that knowledge is produced by unreliable abilities. Previous research strongly supports the conclusion that abilism better describes how knowledge is actually defined in commonsense and science. In this paper, I provide a novel argument that abilism is ethically superior to reliabilism. Whereas reliabilism unethically discriminates against agents by excluding them from knowing, abilism virtuously includes them.
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  • Ingeniería conceptual e innovación teórica: esbozo de un modelo.Carlos Muñoz-Suárez - 2021 - Escritos 29 (62):144-171.
    Every area of knowledge is based on a variety of products of conceptual engineering. This article is programmatic in essence: it aims at introducing a model of how conceptual engineering works and, particularly, how conceptual innovation is achieved in the context of theoretical inquiry. First, it describes the context in which the explicit study of the relevance, scope, mechanisms, and aims of conceptual engineering was born. Secondly, it introduces a distinction between evaluative and instrumental conceptual engineering based on the difference (...)
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