Summary The article explores psychological motives in Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. Blaustein was educated in Lvov, Freiburg im Breisgau and Berlin. In his original explorations, he attempted to connect a phenomenological perspective with descriptive psychology. As trained by Twardowski, he took over some motives of understanding the method of philosophy (psychology), its objectives and aims. The author situates Blaustein also in a dialogue with Stumpf and next to the context of Dilthey’s humanistic psychology is examined. Finally, the article explores the influences (...) of Gestalt psychology on Blaustein. The ultimate thesis of the article is that Blaustein’s method can be grasped as a phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology. (shrink)

Dialectica, Volume 73, Issue 4, Page 591-597, December 2019.

Both through his own work and that of his students, Franz Clemens Brentano had an often underappreciated influence on the course of 20 th - and 21 st -century philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ offers full coverage of Brentano’s philosophy and his influence. It contains 38 brand-new essays from an international team of experts that offer a comprehensive view of Brentano’s central research areas—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and value theory—as well as of the principal (...) figures shaped by Brentano’s school of thought. A General Introduction serves as an overview of Brentano and the contents of the volume and three separate bibliographies point students and researchers on to further avenues of inquiry. Systematic and detailed, _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ provides readers with a valuable reference to Brentano’s work, and to his lasting importance in the history of philosophy and in contemporary debates. (shrink)

This is the introduction to volume IX of Brentano’s Complete Published Writings: Sämtliche veröffentlichte Schriften: Vermischte Schriften. Brentano’s writings reproduced in this volume provide a substantial complement to important aspects of Brentano's philosophy which are less explicit in the other works he published during his lifetime. This volume contains thirteen writings: three of them belong to the period of Würzburg, two to the Italian period, and the others belong to the period of his teaching in Vienna. They can be grouped (...) under three broad categories. The first corresponds to the theme of the future of philosophy and the philosophical prospects in the late nineteenth century. This issue is recurrent in Brentano's work and is to be found in several of his writings published in this volume, notably in his inaugural address at the University of Vienna, in which he seeks, among other things, to trace the sources of discouragement with respect to the state of philosophy at that time and to rehabilitate confidence and optimism in the future of philosophy. The second topic pertains to Brentano’s philosophy of the history of philosophy and in addition to the article already mentioned in which Brentano elaborates his theory of the four phases, the article „Was für ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht“ is an application of the principles of his philosophy of history to Plotinus’ philosophy. The last section entitled Reviews and circumstantial writings contains more circumstantial writings including four reviews, Brentano’s 1908 paper on Thomas von Aquin and a short polemical paper on research without prejudice. It includes „Der Atheismus und die Wissenschaft“ which is an anonymous article in which Brentano criticizes the author of an article published in a Vienna journal on the compatibility of theism with a philosophy that defines itself as science; the second is Brentano’s reply to a critical review of his Psychology by Adolf Horwicz, the third is a review of J. Delitzsch's book on Thomas von Aquinas , and the last is a significant review of a book by Franz Miklosich on the topic of subjektlose Sätze. (shrink)

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological (...) procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland. (shrink)

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological (...) procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland. (shrink)