This paper tries to extend Hintikka's inductive logic so that we can confirm a causally necessary statement. For this purpose, a joint system of inductive logic and logic of causal modalities is constructed. This system can offer a plausible explication of the distinction between nomic and accidental universality, as well as a good formulation of a causal law. And the transition from actuality to causal necessity is construed, in this system, as essentially probabilistic; i.e. no statements about actuality can entail (...) a necessary statement, but certain statements about actuality can single out a most probable causal law. (shrink)

The recent theories of truthlikeness have not paid attention to the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations. L.J. Cohen has expressed this by saying that science aims at legisimilitude rather than verisimilitude. G. Oddie has given a reply to Cohen by defining the notion of legisimilitude in terms of higher-order logics. This paper gives a different reply to Cohen by treating laws as physically necessary generalizations and by defining the notion of legisimilitude as closeness to a suitably chosen lawlike sentence.

This paper takes two tasks. The one is elaborating on the relationship of inductive logic with decision theory to which later Carnap planned to apply his system (§§1-7); this is a surveying side of this article. The other is revealing the property of our prediction of the future, subjectivity (§§8-11); this is its philosophical aspect. They are both discussed under the name of belief in causation. Belief in causation is a kind of “degree of belief” born about the causal effect (...) of the action. As such, it admits of the analysis by inductive logic. (shrink)