The concept of truth has many aims but only one source. The article describes the primary concept of truth, here called the synthetic concept of truth, according to which truth does not belong exclusively to us nor exclusively to nature: truth is the objective result of the synthesis of us and nature in the process of rational cognition. It is shown how various aspects of the concept of truth – logical, scientific, and mathematical aspect – arise from the synthetic concept (...) of truth. Related to these aspects, (i) the role of the predicate of truth in the concept of truth is analysed, (ii) Tarski’s definition of truth and its role in the concept of truth are analysed, and (iii) the position of the paradoxes of truth in the concept of truth is analysed. (shrink)

This paper presents an objection to Peter Railton’s full-information account of non-moral value. According to this account, if an idealized individual A who is fully rational and has full information wants the non-idealized A to desire X, then X is good for A. Those desires like X are called objective interests. Railton’s analysis holds that non-moral values are constituted by natural facts that are independent of subjective opinions. I argue that it is hard for the full-information analysis to achieve all (...) its goals. My discussion focuses on intrinsic interests—those good for an individual without reference to any other objective interests. I attempt to show that either it is hard for the full-information account to give a normative force on individuals, or the account is circular. The conclusion I reach is moderate: in its current version, the full-information analysis of non-moral value cannot explain the link between the normative and the empirical. (shrink)