Since the critique of psychologism initiated by Gottlob Frege and championed by Edmund Husserl, logicians and psychologists alike have adhered to a strict division of labour. This has created a gap between reasoning as a psychological phenomenon and logic. However, reasoning involves logic, and logic is the benchmark of rationality; intuitively at least, reasoning and logic are connected. Recently, attempts have been made to bridge the gap, but the strict division of labour is often eroded. Jean Piaget conceived genetic epistemology (...) as a science of the growth of knowledge, and since logical knowledge is in its purview the accusation of psychologism was omnipresent. In this paper, I outline Piaget's psychological account of the development of logic and argue that he successfully navigated the hazards of psychologism. In essence, he minds the gap by preserving the division of labour; however, by making logic the mirror of thought, he also intimated at a bridge. Concrete correspondences between logic and psychological structures of thought lie at the heart of Piaget's metaphor, and, by building on these foundations, I illustrate how an axiom schema for sentential logic can be derived from the interpropositional grouping, Piaget's psychological model of the operational structure characterising hypothetico-deductive reasoning. (shrink)

An Introduction to the Special Issue on Question Processing.

In recent years we have witnessed a cognitive or ‘practical’ turn in logic [Gabbay and Woods, 2005; Urbański, 2011]. The most fundamental claim of its proponents is that logic has much to say about actual reasoning and argumentation. This cognitively-orientated logic. It acquires a new task of “systematically keeping track of changing representations of information” [van Benthem, 2008, p. 73], and, due to all the achievements of the mathematisation of logic, is fully up to this task. It also contests the (...) claim that distinction between a descriptive and a normative account of the analysis of reasoning is disjoint and exhaustive [Gabbay and Woods, 2003, p. 37]. (shrink)

Prezentujemy dwa formalne narzędzia służące do modelowania rozumowań, za pomocą których rozwiązywane są szczególnego rodzaju problemy abdukcyjne. Pierwszy model, osadzony w formalizmie logiki pytań, bazuje na pojęciu słabej implikacji erotetycznej. Drugi model wykorzystuje relacje zawężania i odsiewania definiowane za po-mocą logiki pytań, semantyki sytuacyjnej i pojęcia relewancjiwątku. Na przykładzie analizy rozgrywek w grę Takie Życie pokazujemy, że oba modele adekwatnie charakteryzują dane empiryczne.