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The Emotive Theory of Ethics

London,: Routledge (1968)

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  1. Value theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The term “value theory” is used in at least three different ways in philosophy. In its broadest sense, “value theory” is a catch-all label used to encompass all branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and sometimes feminist philosophy and the philosophy of religion — whatever areas of philosophy are deemed to encompass some “evaluative” aspect. In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory of particular concern to consequentialists. In (...)
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  • A Plea for Judgment.Michael Davis - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (4):789-808.
    Judgment is central to engineering, medicine, the sciences and many other practical activities. For example, one who otherwise knows what engineers know but lacks engineering judgment may be an expert of sorts, a handy resource much like a reference book or database, but cannot be a competent engineer. Though often overlooked or at least passed over in silence, the central place of judgment in engineering, the sciences, and the like should be obvious once pointed out. It is important here because (...)
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  • The primacy of the virtuous.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Philosophia 20 (1-2):69-91.
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  • Philosophy of language for metaethics.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. New York, USA: Routledge.
    Metaethics is the study of metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language, insofar as they relate to the subject matter of moral or, more broadly, normative discourse – the subject matter of what is good, bad, right or wrong, just, reasonable, rational, what we must or ought to do, or otherwise. But out of these four ‘core’ areas of philosophy, it is plausibly the philosophy of language that is most central to metaethics – and not simply (...)
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  • Bias? Who is Bias? Comments to Dellsén.Juan J. Colomina-Almiñana - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):35-42.
    , 3661–3678, 2020) argues that a positivistic defense of science’s objectivity is incoherent because bias in the generation of scientific theories (implies that the rational evaluation of theories will also be biased. Even though this is an idea easy to agree with, this approach is flawed for two different but related reasons. First, Dellsén’s notion of bias does not account for many ordinary biases. Second, Dellsén’s use of bias at the community-level is inconsistent. It shifts from individual scientists generating new (...)
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  • An anti‐essentialist view of the emotions.Joel J. Kupperman - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.
    Emotions normally include elements of feeling, motivation, and also intentionality; but the argument of this essay is that there can be emotion without feeling, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is (among other things) a belief about or construal of it. Many recent writers have claimed that some form of intentionality is essential to emotion, and then have created lines of defence for this thesis. Thus, what look like troublesome (...)
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  • The epistemology of non-instrumental value.Joel J. Kupperman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):659–680.
    Might there be knowledge of non-instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing-how with knowing-that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non-instrumental value which are not commonly found in other things (...)
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  • Charles Leslie Stevenson.Daniel R. Boisvert - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Orthodox Liturgy and Ethics: a Case Study.Stanley S. Harakas - 2002 - Studies in Christian Ethics 15 (1):11-24.
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  • Katz on 'good' again.R. G. Stubbings - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):62 – 66.
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  • Nothing New in Ecumenia? Hare, Hybrid Expressivism and de dicto Beliefs.Daniel Eggers - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):831-847.
    One important trend in the debate over expressivism and cognitivism is the emergence of ‘hybrid’ or ‘ecumenical’ theories. According to such theories, moral sentences express both beliefs, as cognitivism has it, and desire-like states, as expressivism has it. One may wonder, though, whether the hybrid move is as novel as its advocates seem to take it to be—or whether it simply leads us back to the conceptions of early expressivists, such as Charles Stevenson or Richard Hare. Michael Ridge has recently (...)
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