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  1. Intuitionistic epistemic logic.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298.
    We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification. We argue that on this view coreflectionA→KAis valid and the factivity of knowledge holds in the formKA→ ¬¬A‘known propositions cannot be false’.We show that the traditional form of factivityKA→Ais a distinctly classical principle which, liketertium non datur A∨ ¬A, does not hold intuitionistically, but, along with the whole of (...)
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  • The Ontology of Justifications in the Logical Setting.Sergei N. Artemov - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (1-2):17-30.
    Justification Logic provides an axiomatic description of justifications and delegates the question of their nature to semantics. In this note, we address the conceptual issue of the logical type of justifications: we argue that justifications in the logical setting are naturally interpreted as sets of formulas which leads to a class of epistemic models that we call modular models . We show that Fitting models for Justification Logic naturally encode modular models and can be regarded as convenient pre-models of the (...)
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  • Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition.Gabriele Usberti - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):37-45.
    I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the (...)
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