O artigo destaca a noção de temporalidade com base na interpretação fenomenológica do texto paulino de 1 Cor 7,29-31 na segunda parte da preleção friburgense do semestre de inverno de 1920/1921 intitulada “Introdução à Fenomenologia da Religião. Heidegger volta-se para o que unicamente faz do cristianismo um evento originariamente histórico, a saber: a fé cristã. Dentre os três fenômenos temporalmente eminentes presentes na segunda parte do curso destacamos a partícula grega hōs mē de 1 Cor 7,29-31 como atuação autêntica do (...) presente: a fórmula hōs mē não tem somente um sentido negativo, mas para Paulo o “como se não” significa que o comportamento induzido pelo viver “como se não” não exclui o engajamento no mundo circundante e mais precisamente contra ele. Explicitar esse “retorno” à situação fática que caracteriza a vida cristã tal como Paulo a viveu através da escrita de suas epístolas implica examinar, sucessivamente, os dois momentos fundamentais da fenomenologia do jovem Heidegger, o texto paulino a partir da relação entre concentração e tensão escatológicas, a fórmula hōs mē e o complexo realizador da vida cristã com base no horizonte escatológico e, a guisa de conclusão, a relação entre “concepção prévia” e facticidade cristã com base na coesão estrutural entre religiosidade cristã originária, experiência fática da vida e temporalidade. (shrink)

"For both Gadamer’s project of a philosophical hermeneutics as for Heidegger’s early understanding of facticity (Faktizität) as practical knowledge, the problem of application is central and is always linked to the specific conditions under which an individual decides to act within a community. Both also agree on the fact that the sciences of man do involve more than the epistemic subject, this is why the context i.e. the phenomenological concept of ‘world’ becomes part of the understanding process, one that cannot (...) be ignored or transformed into an abstract matter. Understanding is therefore also in a specific way ‘historical’, as the application is dictated by momentary circumstances in life situations, which come before any use of theoretical knowledge and thus do not represent an appendix to theory. While Gadamer continuously insisted on the idea of a practical knowledge (Wissen) that surpasses the separations between theory and praxis, sophia and phronesis, Heidegger radicalized the idea of active thinking as an experience of language in connection to an essential ‘perception’ of Being itself, that goes beyond any subjectivity. The term by which he often characterizes this essential thinking (wesentliches Denken) is Vernehmen: a kind of receptive thinking. This conception of receptive thinking, as some conversations around the Zollikon Seminars and Le Thor/Zähringen will briefly show, lead Heidegger also to some interesting considerations on the human body. Keywords: practical knowledge, historicity, life, body, Vernehmen, phenomenological hermeneutics, world. ". (shrink)

In the Cartesian tradition of discussing the structure of the micro-judgement “I think” Kant‘s treatment deserves extraordinary attention. Under the idiomatic heading of self-affection he delivers a micro-analysis of this judgment, contributing in a unique way to the clarification of a singular case of self-knowledge: In this case the thinking subject 1. thematises the act of judging “I think” by conferring on this act the specific logical, categorical form, 2. intuits this act under the temporal form of successively using “I...” (...) as subject and “… think” as predicate, 3. identifies him-/herself — at the same time — with the subject logically structuring this act as well as with the subject intuiting the successively existing subject of this judging act, and 4. recognises him-/herself as identical in these two different cognitive roles. By this very analysis Kant shows that the eminent micro-judgement-act “I think” has the complex, though paradigmatic substructure of each human subject recog­nising his/her identity as thinking / judging and temporally existing while thinking / judging. (shrink)