Switch to: References

Citations of:

An addendum to the note on the liar-paradox

A. P. Ushenko

Mind 66 (261):98 (1957)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

The Liar Paradox and “Meaningless” Revenge.Jared Warren - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (1):49-78.details A historically popular response to the liar paradox (“this sentence is false”) is to say that the liar sentence is meaningless (or semantically defective, or malfunctions, or…). Unfortunately, like all other supposed solutions to the liar, this approach faces a revenge challenge. Consider the revenge liar sentence, “this sentence is either meaningless or false”. If it is true, then it is either meaningless or false, so not true. And if it is not true, then it can’t be either meaningless or (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Chrysippus intuition and contextual theories of truth.Jay Newhard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345-352.details Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

1