El análisis de las ideas que al-Fārābī heredó de Las Leyes de Platón ha sido prácticamente desatendida a pesar de que ello contribuiría a una mejor comprensión de uno de los problemas que ha sido discutido entre los seguidores de la interpretación de Leo Strauss y sus críticos, a saber, las tensiones entre religión y política tanto en Las Leyes de Platón como en la filosofía política de al-Fārābī. En este artículo argumento que una interpretación integral de la filosofía política (...) de al-Fārābī ayuda a esclarecer aquella tensión que ha sido polémicamente interpretada por Leo Strauss, como una antinomia. (shrink)

RésuméLe présent article propose la liste des œuvres médicales composées par Ibn Bājja, donne une présentation synthétique de celles qui nous ont été transmises et étudie le métacommentaire au commentaire de Galien sur lesAphorismesd'Hippocrate (Sharḥ fī al-Fuṣūl). Ce texte montre une influence profonde d'al- Fārābī, en particulier dans sa conception de l'expérience médicale, qui remonte à la façon dont ce dernier construit l'expérience (tajriba) comme le procédé inductif, décrit par Aristote dans lesSeconds Analytiques, produisant les prémisses de la démonstration. Sur (...) cette base, Ibn Bājja défend la pertinence d'une médecine moins scolastique et plus empirique, une position dont Ibn Rushd se fera l'écho. Des similitudes entre le texte d'Ibn Bājja et leK. al-Kulliyyāt fī al-ṭibbd'Ibn Rushd suggèrent que celui-ci avait lu leSharḥ fī al-Fuṣūl. Cette œuvre, en outre, pourrait bien attester que la dissection humaine était pratiquée à l'époque d'Ibn Bājja. (shrink)

This dissertation offers a new and comprehensive analysis of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's cosmology by focusing on various important issues that have been largely neglected by the modern scholarship. It provides an examination of the physical, metaphysical, and astronomical aspects of al-Fārābī's cosmology by adopting a multidisciplinary approach that takes into account the history of philosophy and the history of astronomy. Accordingly, my dissertation explores how al-Fārābī attempted to reconcile features of Ptolemaic astronomy with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic theories, an endeavor which (...) resulted in the formulation of innovative cosmological ideas. Chapters I and II provide background information on al-Fārābī's activity as a commentator and his relation to the Greek commentatorial tradition and assess the relevant primary sources. In addition, they examine al-Fārābī's approach to cosmology and his scientific method in terms of both the Ptolemaic astronomical tradition and the Aristotelian corpus. Chapter III addresses problems related to the structure of al-Fārābī's cosmology, especially the origin of his ennadic cosmological model and his spherology. Particular attention is devoted to the question of how Aristotle's unmoved movers and Ptolemy's astronomical theories are reconciled. Chapters IV, V, and VI analyze the place of celestial matter, intellect, and motion respectively in al-Fārābī's cosmology and attempt to redefine the second teacher's relation to the various trends of Greek philosophy. The study stresses al-Fārābī's connection with the Neoplatonic and Peripatetic currents, particularly with thinkers such as Alexander of Aphrod. (shrink)

The historian Agathias (Hist. II 30.3-31.4) relates that under the Emperor Justinian seven philosophers (Damascius, Simplicius, Eulamius, Priscianus, Hermeias, Diogenes, and Isidorus) sought refuge in Persia because of their own country's anti-pagan laws but that they ultimately returned in 532 to the Roman Empire. There have been many hypotheses about the fate of these philosophers after their return. Most recently M. Tardieu has argued that these philosophers went to Harran, a town that was located on the Persian frontier and that (...) remained mostly pagan until the tenth century. This hypothesis, which M. Tardieu had backed with a number of arguments, has found many echoes, both positive and negative, in subsequent secondary literature. Yet the complexity of the issue has never really been faced by Tardieu's critics. For example, the fact that, according to Arab sources, Simplicius could found a famous school of mathematics has been completely neglected, as has the fact that details of the dogmas of Manicheanism, which he obtained through his encounter with a member of that sect, enable one to envision a Mesopotamian locale for this encounter. The present study aims at taking stock of the elements of this controversy, beginning with a detailed article by D. Watts and a review by C. Luna. Watts mostly bases his criticisms of M. Tardieu and me on Luna's summary. In the conclusion (pages 58-59), I summarize the main points that seem to me to confirm M. Tardieu's hypothesis. (shrink)

When questioning whether political deception can be ethically warranted, two competing intuitions jump to the fore. First, political deception is a fact of human life, used in the realpolitik of governance. Second, the ethical warrant of truth asserts itself as inexorably and indefatigably preferable to falsehood. Unfortunately, a cursory examination of the history of philosophy reveals a paucity of models to marry these basic intuitions. Some thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Kant, Mill, and Rawls) privilege the truth by neglecting the (...) realpolitik, i.e., the truth is inviolate. Others (e.g., Machiavelli, Bentham, and the often infamous caché of 20th century dictators) focus upon the realpolitik to the exclusion of the primacy of the truth. A third group of critical thinkers (e.g., Arendt and Bok) examine the topic but offer no positive, systematic treatment of deception. Lacking are theories which simultaneously recognize that political untruth is often necessary, but that untruth is only justified when a) truth is politically impossible, b) the necessity of untruth is demonstrable, and c) the truth can be replaced with a minimally injurious untruth. Plato offers one such account in the Republic, arguing that deceit must be applied medicinally to the city. However, his account is problematic in detail. One of Plato’s inheritors, the 10th century thinker al-Fārābī, advanced Plato’s theoretical account, arguing that political governance requires restrained political deception. This deception, the expression of philosophical truths through the symbols of religion, meets the criteria mentioned above, being necessary, demonstrably necessary, and minimally injurious. But while al-Fārābī provides a valuable model for what justified political deception could look like, the lengths to which he must go in order to create a viable model for political deception reveals the untenability of the notion of justified political deception writ large. One must orchestrate an entire cosmos around the notion, notably a cosmos that does not match our own. One must adopt very specific conceptions of human nature, association, and happiness, as well as a particular metaphysics and epistemology. For, while al-Fārābī shows that political deception can be justifiable, he also reveals its unjustifiability outside an idealized setting. (shrink)