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Attentional Moral Perception

Jonna Vance & Preston J. Werner

Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):501-525 (2022)

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Considering the Purposes of Moral Education with Evidence in Neuroscience: Emphasis on Habituation of Virtues and Cultivation of Phronesis.Han Hyemin - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1):111-128.details In this paper, findings from research in neuroscience of morality will be reviewed to consider the purposes of moral education. Particularly, I will focus on two main themes in neuroscience, novel neuroimaging and experimental investigations, and Bayesian learning mechanism. First, I will examine how neuroimaging and experimental studies contributed to our understanding of psychological mechanisms associated with moral functioning while addressing methodological concerns. Second, Bayesian learning mechanism will be introduced to acquire insights about how moral learning occurs in human brains. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Attention, Moral Skill, and Algorithmic Recommendation.Nick Schuster & Seth Lazar - 2024 - Philosophical Studies.details Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While recommender systems could in principle enhance our moral agency by enabling us to cut through the information (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can.James Hutton - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (6):106.details Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Perception, Self, and Zen: On Iris Murdoch and the Taming of Simone Weil.Silvia Caprioglio Panizza - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (64):64.details How do we see the world aright? This question is central to Iris Murdoch’s philosophy as well as to that of her great source of inspiration, Simone Weil. For both of them, not only our action, but the very quality of our being depends on the ability to see things as they are, where vision is both a metaphor for immediate understanding and a literal expression of the requirement to train our perception so as to get rid of illusions. For (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?Preston J. Werner - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (3):49.details According to contentful moral perception (CMP), moral properties can be perceived in the same sense as tables, tigers, and tomatoes. Recently, Heather Logue (2012) has distinguished between two potential ways of perceiving a property. A Kantian Property (KP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access involves a detection of the property via a representational vehicle. A Berkeleyan Property (BP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access to the property involves that property as partly constitutive of the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Seeing Wrongness.Josefa Toribio - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-22.details This paper examines the plausibility of an attention-based version of moral perceptualism (amp). According to amp, our perception of moral properties is characterized by perceptual attentional patterns that reflect a sensitivity to morally salient features. First, I argue that the explanation for the empirical evidence offered to support amp primarily hinges on cognitive processes rather than perceptual ones. Second, while I acknowledge the critical importance of attention in recognizing moral properties, I contend that we must expand amp’s explanatory scope to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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