How can the harm caused by waves of fake news or derogatory speech on social media be minimized without unduly limiting freedom of expression? I draw on an eighteenth-century debate for thinking about this problem: Hume and Smith present two different models of the transmission of emotions and ideas. Empathetic processes are causal, almost automatic processes; sympathy, in contrast, means putting oneself into the other person’s position and critically evaluating how one should react. I use this distinction to argue that (...) the architectural logic of social media should be improved to prevent cumulative harms and to facilitate sympathetic processes. (shrink)

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. (...) We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory. (shrink)

The concept of “humanity” is integral to David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, but barely appears in his earlier Treatise. Many consider the later “humanity” theory superior, permitting a more “extensive” sympathy not limited by proximate associations. This paper argues for Hume's consistency on humanity by surveying The History of England. Hume's History discussions lend support to the associative, and thus limited, Treatise conception. Humanity is opposed to religious enthusiasm; its positive effects are local and particular. Moreover, Hume's (...) historiography involves a hesitation on the content of “humane” judgments, which cannot fulfill the cosmopolitan function envisioned by many present-day interpreters. (shrink)